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Economists  generally  argue that the level and structure  of a country's own trade barriers,
as well as the "quality"  of its governance  policies, such as regulations  on foreign investment  or
bureaucratic "red tape" on commercial  activity, will have a major influence  on its economic
growth and performance. However, a problem previously  encountered  in attempts  to test these
relations empirically was that no objective cross-country  indices of the quality of governance
were available, nor were general statistics  on developing  countries' trade barriers.  Several  new
sources of empirical information  help fill these information  gaps and can be used to test the
influence  of trade and governance  policies  on economic  performance. This study  conducts  these
tests utilizing a model similar to those employed  in the literature on the causes and implications
of economic  growth. However, our analysis  differs somewhat  in that we focus more heavily on
an alternative measure of economic  performance - the World Bank's index of the speed with
which countries  are integrating  into the global economy.
Our results show countries  which adopted less commercially  restrictive governance  and
trade policies  generally  achieved  significantly  higher levels of GDP per capita, they experienced
higher growth rates for exports, imports  and GDP, and were more successful  in integrating  into
the global economy.  Regression results indicate national trade and governance regulations
explain over 60 percent of the variance in some measures  of economic performance  - which
implies  that a country's own national  policies  are a major determinant  of its rate of development,
industrialization  and growth.  Our tests also provide new insights  concerning  the phenomenon
of economic  "convergence"  in that they show  poorer open countries  are integrating  more rapidly
into the global economy than others.  This finding parallels what others have observed in
economic  growth rates.
This study tests its empirical  results in a "case study"  involving  Sub-Saharan  Africa, and
asks whether inappropriate  national policies  caused  the region's dismal  economic  performance?
The evidence  strongly supports  this proposition.  Indices  of the quality of national governance
show African countries have generally adopted the  most inappropriate (restrictive) fiscal,
monetary, property and  wage policies, and  their own trade  barriers  (including customs
procedures  that are a major constraint  to commercial  activity)  are among  the highest  of any other
regional  group.
Regression  tests indicate  that an "improvement"  of African  trade and governance  policies
to levels that currently prevail in such (non-exceptional)  countries  like Panama, Jordan, or Sri
Lanka would be consistent  with a seven-fold  increase  in GDP per capita (to about $3,500) and
an annual increase  of about 3 to 4 percentage  points in the growth rate for this variable.  Since
African exports generally  face zero or very low tariffs, and relatively  few nontariff barriers in
major OECD markets, the implications  of these findings are that the region's most pressing
economic  and trade problems  will primarily have to be resolved by Africa itself through the
implementation  of badly needed government  policy reforms.  In the 1997  World Development
Report the World Bank  provided a graphic description  of the magnitude  of these problems:(ii)
"Achieving  a turnaround  in the effectiveness  of the state [in Sub-Saharan Africa] will
not be easy since the roots of state failure are many and complex.  Chief among them has
been a continuing struggle between traditional forms of governance and social organization
(often based on tribes,  lineages, and language and kinship groups) and modern forms of
government.  High military expenditure and dysfunctional behavior of military personnel
(in the absence of other checks and balances) have been important impediments. These have
often reduced the transparency and accountability of public institutions to the extent that
govermnents have felt a decreasing need to explain and justify their actions to the domestic
population."
Implementing  the needed improvements  in governance  will require major commitments,
resolve  and  dedication  that  many  African  leaders  typically  have  not  exhibited  in  the  past.
However, for past and present problems  to be effectively  addressed such changes  are clearly of
fundamental importance.GOOD GOVERNANCE  AND TRADE POLICY
Are They the Keys to Africa's Global Integration  and Growth?
Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats*
I. INTRODUCTION
The role and contribution  of international  trade to the process of industrialization  and
growth has long been a topic of interest to economists,  and a large number  of studies examined
this relationship  empirically.  Most of these investigations  confirmed  Kravis (1970)  conclusion
that international  trade provides  an important  stimulus  to growth.'  As a result, attention  shifted
to  the  identification of  factors that constrained a  country's  capacity to  fully engage in
international  trade and experience its beneficial economic  effects. 2 While high foreign tariffs
'The authors are with the Trade Research Team in the Development  Research Group, the World Bank,
Washington  D.C. The views expressed in this paper need not reflect those of the World Bank, its member
governments,  or its staff. We would like to thank Alan Winters and Lant Pritchett for numerous  comments  and
suggestions.
'Kravis' often cited work concluded  that  trade was an "engine  of growth"  in the 19th  century.  Although  he still
found  a strong  positive  relation  between  the two he concluded  it was  a "handmaiden  of growth"  in the 20th  century.
See Singer (1950), Myrdal (1957), Harberler (1959), Prebish (1959), or Chenery (1961) among others for
illustrative  examples  of the general theoretical  and  conceptual  debate  on the relationship  between  trade and growth.
Representative  studies  which  attempted  to test this relationship  empirically  include  Maizels  (1968),  Michaely  (1977),
Balassa  (1978), Bhagwati  (1978), Reidel (1984), Singer and Grey (1988) or Ng and Yeats (1997) among others.
2Keesing  (1967) provides a useful discussion  of the reason why trade has these positive industrialization  and
development  effects. Trade brings  individuals  in developing  countries  into contact  with  new technologies,  products
and skills and these learning effects produce an outward shift of the production-possibility  frontier. International
trade also  offers a means  whereby  some  countries  can circumvent  the natural  limitations  of their own small  domestic
markets. Production  for export can increase  employment  opportunities  directly and may also have similar  effects
in industries  with forward  or backward  linkages  to the export sector. Increased  competition  from foreign  firms can
also weaken the monopoly  position  of some domestic  enterprises  and result in lower prices and better service for
consumers.  Trade can also produce important  long-term  benefits  if foreign  competition  forces local producers  to
modernize  and keep abreast of recent developments  and technologies.2
and nontariff restrictions can  reduce trade below potential levels, it was recognized that
domestically imposed restrictions can have  similar adverse effects in  less evident ways.
Specifically,  a growing  number  of empirical  investigations  showed  a country's own trade policies
may create a significant  bias against exportables, cause a mis-allocation  of resources among
industries  producing for the domestic market, and also reduce a country's capacity to respond
to unfavorable  external shocks. 3 These twin conclusions;  (i) that trade has an important  positive
impact  on industrialization  and growth; and (ii) high domestic  trade barriers reduce a country's
capacity to benefit from potential  learning  experiences,  keep abreast with modern technologies,
realize higher foreign exchange  earnings, or benefit from more vigorous  competition  are at the
core of policy prescriptions  that seek a liberalization  of a country's own trade restrictions to
improve overall economic  performance.
The physical  characteristics  of a country,  and its own governnental  policies  that influence
the general  business "environment,"  can also have  a major impact  on a nation's ability  to achieve
its economic  potential. Domestic  tax and profit retention  policies, those  relating  to the provision
of social services, measures  bearing on political  stability  or the ease with which businesses  are
established  and operate, policies relating to the quality and availability  of transport, financial,
communications  or educational  services  certainly  will have a key influence  on a country's ability
3Balassa  and Associates  (1971), UN Economic  Commission  for Asia and the Far East (1972), and Grubel  and
Johnson (1971) show  how the level and structure  of a country's own trade barriers may incorporate  an important
anti-export  bias.  Balassa  (1982)(1983)  determined  that countries  which  pursued "outward  oriented"  trade policies,
characterized  by low import barriers were better able to respond  to adverse  external shocks  than those with high
tariffs and restrictive NTBs. The negative growth and industrialization  record of countries that adopted "import
substitution"  development  strategies  provides  further evidence  as to the superiority  of open trade policies.3
to attract  investment  needed  to foster industrialization  and integration  into the global  economy.'
In short, four general factors can influence a country's trade and growth: (i) the level and
structure of trade restrictions  encountered  in major export markets; (ii) domestic  trade policies
implemented  by the country itself; (iii) local government  policies affecting  the general business
climate and the ability of local entrepreneurs  to exploit opportunities  in foreign and domestic
markets; and (iv) physical characteristics  of a country like its size, resource endowments,
location, and climate. Much of the recent literature  on the causes and implications  of economic
growth (as reflected in studies by Sachs and Warner (1995)(1998)  or Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1991)(1992))  attempt  to identify  factors  promoting  economic  performance  and  empirically  assess
their relative importance.
Although  considerable  evidence  has accumulated  concerning  the sources  and implications
of economic  growth (such  as the presumed  tendency  of open economies  to "converge"  at similar
levels of income), some potentially  useful cross-country  analyses were constrained  by the fact
that many policy variables  relating to governance  had not been systematically  quantified. Even
information  on most developing  countries' tariffs and nontariff  barriers were not available in a
common  format, or for common  points in time (this was not the case for OECD  countries' trade
barriers), and this greatly limited  possibilities  for empirical  analyses  of the relationship  between
4The importance  of good governance  as a catalyst  to industrialization  and growth in developing  countries  is put
graphically by the World Banlc  (1997): "The clamor for greater government  effectiveness  has reached crisis
proportions  in many developing  countries where the state has failed to deliver  even such fundamental  public  goods
as property  rights, roads, and  basic  health  and education. There  a vicious  circle has taken  hold: people  and business
respond  to deteriorating  public services  by avoiding  taxation, which  leads to further deterioration  in services. In
the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe it was the state's long-term failure to deliver on its
promises  that led, finally,  to its overthrow. But the collapse  of central planning  has created problems  of its own.
In the resulting  vacuum,  citizens  are sometimes  deprived  of basic  public  goods such as law and order. At the limit,
as in Afghanistan,  Liberia, and Somalia, the state has sometimes  crumbled entirely, leaving individuals  and
international  agencies  trying desperately  to pick up the pieces.4
foreign and domestic trade barriers,  the quality of governance, and growth. 5 However, trade
barriers  in developing countries,  as well as empirical  measures of the quality of governance,
have recently improved  dramatically and  the possibilities  for cross-country  analyses of  their
effects considerably increased.
This  study's  objective  is to employ these new data  sources in  an examination  of the
relationship between the level of both foreign and domestic trade barriers, and factors pertaining
to quality of governance and the business environment on economic performance.  The paper
proceeds as follows.  First,  the sources and properties  of the new empirical  information are
discussed and  these statistics  are then used to construct  a database  on trade and  governance
policies in 80 developing countries.  This section of the report also discusses the use of several
economic "performance"  variables that can provide a measure of a country's  industrialization
and growth.  Next, correlation  tests are employed to determine the extent to which the trade,
governmental policies,  and economic performance variables are related and how strong is the
association.  Third,  a multiple regression  model, which  is patterned on previous  analyses by
Sachs and Warner (1995)(1988), is then employed to assess the combined influence of the trade
and governance policies on economic performance.  We do, however, take a somewhat different
orientation than most previous "growth" studies in that we focus more heavily on the speed with
'To  provide  the required  information  for multilateral  trade negotiations  such as the Uruguay  Round, international
agencies (primarily UNCTAD and the GATT) devoted considerable  time and resources to the compilation  of
statistics  on trade restrictions  in OECD  markets. This information  played a key role in insuring  the success  of the
multilateral  trade negotiations  (MTNs)  since  it provided  negotiators  with  the required  information  on the restrictions
they were attempting  to reduce.  However, since most developing  countries did not actively participate  in past
negotiations  there was much less of an incentive  to compile information  on their trade barriers. In previous  MTNs
developing  countries generally clung to the principle of nonreciprocity  arguing that, due to the nature of their
internal  development  problems, it was not feasible to offer reciprocal tariff reductions in return for those of
developed  countries. Since the developing  countries were in fact trying to negotiate tariff cuts in their export
markets,  without  offering concessions  in return, their bargaining  power was, at best, very weak.5
which individual  countries are integrating into the global economy as a primary measure of
economic  performance. Fourth, the study  then applies  the empirical  findings in a "case study"
involving Sub-Saharan  Africa to determine  the extent to which inappropriate  domestic  policies
contributed  to the region's generally  dismal  economic  performance.  The study closes with an
overall assessment  of the results and their implications  for the formulation  of trade and growth
policies.
It. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
This study draws on three independently  compiled  databases  developed  by national and
international  organizations. Statistics  on foreign and domestic trade barriers were taken from
published UNCTAD reports (and to a lesser extent those of the World Trade Organization),
while empirical indices of  the quality of  national governance were drawn from a  recent
publication  by the Heritage  Foundation  and the Wall Street Journal. The empirical  measures  of
economic  performance,  such as the speed of integration into the global economy, or growth in
GDP, or exports, were drawn from World Bank  publications.
A. Statistics  on Developing  Countries' Trade Barriers
Over the past two decades the United Nations Conference  on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)  took the lead in compiling  statistics  on developed  countries' trade barriers with the
objective of producing an "inventory"  of matched trade, tariff and nontariff barrier statistics
(Laird and Yeats 1990  describe  the methodology  used in preparing  this information  and potential
applications  use in research  and  policy studies). UNCTAD  (1994a)(1994b)  subsequently  updated6
and extended its earlier inventory  to cover about 100 developed  and developing  countries.
Although less extensive in  its national coverage, the  GATT  (now World Trade
Organization)  also collected  and published  empirical infornation on trade and trade barriers in
individual  countries chosen for this organization's trade policy review (TPR) process.  The
country specific TPR reports normally provide extensive tabular information  on tariffs and
nontariff  restrictions  applied  by the country  under investigation  (see GATT 1990, 1992 or 1995
for representative  examples of the statistics  generated). Unlike the UNCTAD statistics, which
are often available  at the level of the tariff line, the WTO data generally  are for more aggregate
product groups.
This study utilizes these statistical sources for data on  trade barriers in developing
countries. In drawing on this information  a specific  sequence  of use was employed. First, we
relied on the UNCTAD (1994a)(1994b)  reports given their common  statistical  format for trade
barrier information  across  countries. The 50 developing  countries  included  in these publications
were all selected for our analysis.  Next, additional  countries that were the focus of a World
Trade Organization  TPR investigation,  but were not included in the UNCTAD reports, were
added with some related data taken from an OECD (1996) publication.  The WTO sources
provided  data for an additional  20 countries. Finally, trade and trade barrier statistics  for a few
additional countries were drawn from an earlier UNCTAD (1987) document.  Since many
developing  countries initiated major trade policy reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s, only
limited  use was made of this report and countries  where  major reforms  occurred  were excluded.
Altogether,  these published  sources  provided  information  on the trade regimes of 80 developing
countries.  The annex and appendix tables to this study provides information  as to how this7
information  was used to compute  country specific information  on trade and nontariff  barriers,
and also gives detailed statistics  on these national trade barriers and the profiles of protection
in the developing  countries.
B. Statistics  on Foreign  Trade Barriers
Our analysis  recognizes  that trade barriers in major foreign export markets can also have
an important  influence  on developing  countries' trade, industrialization  and growth prospects.
If foreign tariffs and nontariff  barriers facing a country's exports are high it may only have a
limited capacity to offset these external constraints - (say) through the adoption  of enlightened
domestic  policies that create a favorable business  climate. Conversely,  economic  performance
in a second country, whose exports do not encounter major trade barriers, may be greatly
stimulated by  the  adoption of  appropriate domestic trade  and governance measures.  In
recognition  of this point, two additional  variables were tested in our analysis.  The first is the
average  pre-Uruguay  Round tariff rate that each country  faced in OECD  markets. The second
was a tabulation of the share of its exports that encountered  one or more forms of OECD
nontariff  restrictions.'  As was the case with the domestic  trade interventions  (see Section A
above), the UNCTAD and World Trade Organization  sources were used for the compilation  of
this additional  information.
6While  it may have been more desirable  to compile this data for all export markets, there were too  many
"holes"  in the available  information  for this approach  to be employed. That is, trade barrier data was not available
for some Latin American,  Asian and African  countries,  or for the states of the former Soviet Union  so a decision
was made  to tabulate  the statistics  for OECD markets  where complete  data were available.  It should be noted that
the OECD  countries are the most important  markets for most developing  countries  and receive approximately  60
percent of the latter's exports.  See Pritchett (1996) for a  useful discussion  of the problem of measures of
"openness"  in individual  countries.8
C. Statistics  on the Ouality of Governance
Although the  approach is  relatively new,  several recent publications attempted to
quantitatively  "measure"  the overall "quality"  of governance  in individual  countries as well as
other factors that influence economic performance and the environment for growth.  For
example, Transparency International recently constructed numeric indices of the  extent of
corruption in  54  developed and developing countries by  using detailed interviews with
government  officials  and local and foreign  businessmen. The indices  ranged,  theoretically,  from
a value of zero for a country perceived to be totally corrupt to a value of 10 for a country
perceived  to be totally clean.
More recently,  the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage  Foundation  (WSJ-Heritage  1997)
compiled  and published  indices of the overall economic  policy environment  in 150 individual
countries along with similar statistics (indices) on government policies relating to ten key
underlying  factors, namely,  the extent  and severity  of trade controls, the overall level of taxation
and its impact  of economic  incentives,  the extent  and severity  of government  interventions  in the
economy,  the appropriateness  of national  monetary policy and its contribution  to inflation, the
extent  to which  restrictions  were placed on capital  flows and their impact  on foreign investment,
the restrictiveness  of government  controls on banking, the extent of government  imposed wage
and price controls, the security of property rights and the degree to which they were protected
by the government,  the extent of government  regulation  of industry, and the size of the black9
market. 7 The WSJ-Heritage  index for each of these variables, which were all assigned  on the
basis of highly objective  underlying  criteria, could take a value ranging from one to five with
lower  values indicating  a policy  environment  more  conducive  to economic  growth. Index  values
were assigned on the basis of clearly specified empirical standards that greatly limited the
potentially  corruptive influence  of subjective  judgements. 8 In addition, an overall index of the
quality of the national economic  environment  was derived by averaging the ten WSJ-Heritage
policy indices.
D. Empirical  Measures  of Economic  Integration  and Performance
While WSJ-Heritage constructed indices for policy variables that should influence
industrialization  and growth, a related  consideration  concerns  the selection  of empirical  measures
of economic performnance? Since gross domestic product (GDP) reflects the value of all
nationally  produced  goods and services, both the level and rate of change in GDP (expressed  on
a  per  capita basis) are  clearly two  relevant measures of  performance.  Cross-country
comparisons of  the  value of  GDP  per capita can  indicate whether nations that pursued
7For example,  in the construction  of the taxation  index five gradations  of income  tax levels  were set - ranging
from no taxes on income  or a flat tax rate of 10 percent or less - a situation  assigned  a value of 1.0 - as opposed
to an environment  where a top rate of over 50 percent was applied  along with a tax on average income  between  20
and 25 percent. This "worst case" environment  was assigned an index of 5.  Similar gradations  were made for
corporate  tax rates and index values assigned. The corporate  and income tax indices were then average to arrive
at an overall "tax environment"  index for the country.  For details as to how the indices were constructed  and
information  on specific  factors surveyed  within each of the other government  policy sectors  see The Wall Street
Journal and Heritage  Foundation  (1997).
8As an illustration,  a trade  policy index  of 1  was assigned  to a country  with average  tariffs of 4 percent or less,
while an index of 2 was assigned  to countries whose  tariffs were in the 5 to 9 percent range. The worse rating (an
index of 5) was assigned  to countries with average tariffs exceeding  20 percent.  WSJ-Heritage  also examined
various published  studies  (IMF, WTO, UNCTAD)  to determine  the extent that nontariff  protection  was used to
supplement  that from tariffs. Where  NTBs were extensively  applied the (tariff  derived)  index was increased  by one
point.10
enlightened trade and governance policies generally achieved higher output levels.  Similarly,
analysis of the rate of change in per capita GDP can show whether countries that adopted such
policies  are  growing  at  above average  rates.  The reader  should note  that here,  and  in  the
discussion that follows, we focus on two different types of performance measures: (i) those that
relate  to  current  levels,  and  those  that  relate  to  recent  changes  in  an  economic  variable.
Differences in the former should reflect differences in previous "achievement" although one must
be careful about lines of causation (that is, richer countries may find it easier to implement lower
trade  barriers  once they pass a certain  threshold).  For  this  reason  we tend to  assign more
importance to tests involving the "rate of change" performance measures.  Another potentially
useful measure of economic performance can be drawn from the World Bank's  (1996) attempt
to derive an index of the success of individual countries in integrating their trade, financial and
other economic ties with the global economy.9 Measures of integration are of interest since this
process should be seen as an intermediate goal that will later influence performance (World Bank
1996, pp.  25-31).  The Bank's  measure  incorporated the rate  of  change in  four underlying
factors,  namely: (i)  changes in  real  trade  as  a share  of  GDP,  (ii) changes in  the country's
institutional investor ratings, (iii) foreign direct  investment (FDI) as a share of GDP,  and (iv)
the share  of manufactures in total exports.'°  The speed of integration index is an average of
the scores  for  these four variables  after  they were  standardized to  have a mean  of 0 and  a
9The  World  Bank  (1997,  p. 2)  provides  a graphic  statement  as  to the  importance  of good  governance  in enabling
assisting  countries  to integrate  into the global  economy. "The  global integration  of economies  and the spread of
democracy  have narrowed  the scope for arbitrary  and capricious  (government)  behavior. Taxes, investment  rules,
and  economic policies must be ever  more responsive to  the parameters of a  globalized world economy.
Technological  change has opened  new opportunities  for unbundling  services and allowing  a larger role for markets.
These changes  have  meant  new and different  roles for government  - no longer as a sole  provider but as a facilitator
and regulator."
'°See World Bank (1996) particularly  Appendix  2 for details of this empirical  analysis.11
standard deviation of 1.  The index would normally range between values of ±  3.0 with higher
positive  index values identifying countries  that were  more successful in  integrating globally.
Negative values indicate the links were deteriorating or developing at a below average rate.
Several additional performance measures, which are based on both the rate of growth and
level of trade,  were  also tested.  For  example, the rate  of change in the value or  volume of
exports  can  indicate how well a  country capitalized on  commercial opportunities  in  foreign
markets."  Were countries that adopted appropriate trade  and governance policies  relatively
more successful in exploiting export opportunities?  Analyses of similar measures for imports
should  show the extent  to which  a  country was able  to draw  upon  foreign suppliers  whose
products  might  be  of superior  quality to  those  available  locally.  Countries should  have an
incentive to reduce barriers which constrain their nationals'  ability to secure superior  foreign
goods given the positive associated welfare and production effects of such access.  Finally,  a
trade  "openness" measure (that is, the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP) also has relevance
for our empirical tests. Since more open countries have demonstrated an ability to better adjust
to  adverse exogenous  shocks, and are better  able to capitalize of  foreign trade opportunities
(Balassa 1982,  1983), increases in this measure could be interpreted  as a gauge of improved
performance.
Before turning to the empirical analysis some additional points should be noted. First,
nonpolicy  factors  like  country  size  or  geographic  location  may  also  influence  economic
"Government  sponsored  incentives  like export subsidies can undermine  the reliability of this variable as a
measure  of economic  performance. For example,  in the 1970s  and 1980s  the European  Economic  Community  paid
massive export subsidies  to sugar exporters  with the result that the EEC grew from a relatively  minor factor in
international  markets to the world's largest sugar exporter, thereby displacing  many traditional suppliers  in the
Caribbean. Some  developing  country  governments  have  also  paid export  subsidies  for manufactured  goods  and  these
have occasionally  been subject  to OECD countervailing  duties.12
performance. Several  published  studies suggested  smaller countries  may face more forrnidable
obstacles to growth and industrialization  due to constraints stemming from limited domestic
market size, or due to a more limited  natural resource base (see Khalif 1974  among  others). For
this reason, two measures  of market size, namely, population  and the value of gross domestic
product were also employed in our initial statistical  analysis since these factors may influence
both the "level" and "growth"  performance  measures.  In addition,  we also recognize  that global
demand and market conditions  for the types of goods a nation produces can have an impact on
the trade and performance  variables. The problems  and benefits of trade for countries whose
exports are concentrated  in energy  products or primary commodities  may be quite different  than
those facing a country whose exports  consisted  largely of manufactured  goods.  This contention
was behind  UNCTAD's efforts to establish  a "Common  Fund" for stabilizing  commodity  prices
(UNCTAD  1972, 1977). For this reason, two dummy  variables  were employed  in the analysis.
The first took a value of unity for countries where three-quarters or more of all exports were
primary commodities,  while the second identified  countries  where energy products  consisted  of
three-quarters or  more of total exports."2  The rationale for identifying the latter group
separately is that they may have considerably  greater access to the financial  resources needed
for industrialization  than most other developing  countries  - or tend to have  overvalued  exchange
rates.
Clearly there are additional  factors  like  climate,  direct access  to ocean transport, distance
to major international  commercial  centers, or the extent of natural resource endowments  that
'2Primary  commodities  were defined  as all items  falling  in SITC  groups 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 68.  Energy  products
included  all items classified  in SITC  group 3.  Binary  variables  were selected for these  terms since they appear to
have exhibited  a superior  performance  in many empirical  studies  of the relation  between  commodity  concentration
of exports and export earnings  instability.13
may also  influence a  country's  industrialization  and growth.  We recognize the  potential
importance  of these factors, but have structured  our approach to focus solely on the influence
of national trade and governance  policies.
III. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, TRADE POLICIES AND GOVERNANCE
While the preceding discussion argued that a country's economic performance was
dependent  on its trade and governance  policies, and the environment  for growth they  create, key
questions  concern the strength  of these  relationships  and whether  there are significant  differences
in the relative importance  of types of policies  (say, tax as opposed  to monetary  policy). If such
differences  exist their identification  could help establish  priorities for policy change.  Since the
relevant variables have all been quantified,  correlation and regression  tests could indicate their
individual  and combined importance.
A. The Influence  of Trade Policy Variables
Table 1  presents results when the eight economic  performance  measures  were correlated
with four measures  of the developing  countries' own trade restrictions  (average  tariffs, average
tariffs plus para-tariff charges, an NTB frequency of use index, and the WSJ-Heritage  trade
policy index), as well as measures  of the level of foreign tariffs and nontariff  barriers these
countries face.  In addition, correlations  between the economic  performance  variables and: (i)
the overall WSJ-Heritage  governance  index; the proxies for country size; and (iii) the dummies
reflecting the composition  of exports are also shown.  Several important  points emerge from
these statistical  tests.14
Strong  significant results  occur  when  the  WSJ-Heritage  trade  policy  and  overall
governance  index  are  correlated  with  the  economic  performance  variables.  In  fact,  the
correlations  between  the  trade  policy  index  and  GDP  per  capita  (a  performance  measure
reflecting the level of development that has been achieved), as well as the speed of integration
index (r  =  - 0.457  and -0.446,  respectively) which is a  measure  of change,  are among the
strongest shown in the table and take the expected directional sign.  The sole exception is the
correlation between the WSJ-Heritage trade policy index and export volume growth rate which
fails to achieve statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level." 3
* Surprisingly,  countries  whose exports  encounter  relatively  high  foreign  tariffs  also
achieved higher rates of growth for both GDP and exports (r = -0.436 and -0.477 respectively).
Higher extemal tariff and nontariff barriers  are also significantly correlated with many of the
other performance variables.  There appear to be at least two likely explanations.  First, the line
of causation which generally occurs is that protectionism is implemented in sectors where trade
is growing  at an  above average pace  or even surging.  Second,  many of the high  trade and
economic growth rate countries, like Korea, Taiwan (China), or Singapore, were more than able
to  overcome  the  relatively  high  external  OECD  trade  barriers  through  the  adoption  of
appropriate domestic governance and trade policies.  As an example, the WSJ-Heritage indices
indicate Hong Kong and Singapore pursued the most enlightened governance policies of all the
developed and developing countries and also had the highest values for most of the performance
variables.  No doubt,  Hong Kong and Singapore's  export and GDP growth would have been
even greater had not their goods encountered relatively high external barriers, but the correlation
results  show they were more than overcome by the adoption of appropriate domestic policies.
There  is  an  important  message  here  for  other  developing  countries  who  assign  excessive
importance to the negative effects of foreign protectionism.
* The  trade  composition  measures  indicate  that  commodity  and  energy  exporting
countries had a generally inferior record for many of the economic performance variables.  In
particular,  both groups recorded high negative correlations with the speed of integration index
(r =  -0.367 and -0.332 respectively) and export value growth (r = -0.410 and -0.369).  Overall,
larger countries also generally experienced somewhat higher GDP growth rates although these
relationships  were not  statistically significant when China and India were  excluded from  the
tests.
'3Since the WSJ-Heritage  indices assign  higher values to less "enlightened"  governance  policies the negative
correlations  were anticipated. That is, countries  that pursued  more appropriate  trade and governance  policies were
rewarded  with higher rates of economic  growth.15
Table  1. Analysis  of the Correlation  Between  Economic  Performance,  Trade  Policy Measures,  Country  Size,  and  the Composition  of  Exports
Economic Performance Variables
General Measures  Export  Growth  Import Growth
Level of GDP  Speed of  Openness  Growth of  Value  Volume  Value  Volume
Dependent Variables  per Capita  Integration  of Economy  GDP  Terms  Terms  Terms  Terms
Domestic Trade Distortions
Average  Tariffs  -0.436*  -0.177  -0.282*  0.088  0.034  -0.029  -0.113  -0.106
Average  Tariff & Para-Tariffs  -0.392*  -0.041  -0.318*  0.048  0.084  0.034  -0.082  -0.032
NTB Frequency of Use Index  -0.292*  -0.048  -0.283*  0.003  0.018  -0.117  0.074  0.016
Heritage Trade Policy Index  -0.457*  -0.446*  -0.292*  -0.262*  -0.240*  -0.172  -0.337*  -0.423*
External Constraints
Average  Tariffs Encountered  0.293*  0.439*  0.218*  0.436*  0.477*  0.462*  0.440*  0.521*
NTBs Encountered  -0.119  0.346*  -0.008  0.276*  0.398*  0.329*  0.212*  0.337*
Overall Governance Index  -0.613*  -0.460*  -0.564*  -0.347*  -0.232*  -0.415*  -0.259*  -0.474*
Size Variables
Population  -0.130  -0.009  -0.166  0.335*  0.229*  0.211*  0.241*  0.208*
Gross Domestic Product  0.165  0.176  -0.095  0.360*  0.389*  0.338*  0.329*  0.367*
Trade Composition Dummies
All Commodity Exports'  -0.077  -0.367*  -0.032  -0.171  -0.410*  -0.292*  -0.221*  -0.317*
Energy Exports 2 0.260*  -0.332*  0.052  -0.215*  1).369*  -0.107  -0.314*  -0.323*
'This variable takes a value of unity if the share of commodities in total exports exceeds 75 percent.
2This variable takes a value of unity in the share of energy products in total exports exceeds 75 percent.
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level16
-Some of the correlations  between average  tariffs and paratariffs, or frequency indices
of NTB use in the developing  countries, and performance  variables  like GDP or export growth
are not statistically significant.  However, the correlations  between the more comprehensive
WSJ-Heritage  trade index and almost all the performance  variables are high and significant." 4
Our analysis of the underlying data indicates a relatively high level of variation exists in the
relative importance  of tariffs as opposed to nontariff  barrier in many countries. Some  countries
rely primarily  on tariffs for protection  while  others are primarily  dependent  on nontariff  barriers
(see Annex Table 7 for evidence on this point).  As a result, any statistical  tests that do not
account  for the joint impact  of these import barriers (as does the WSJ-Heritage  index) will not
adequately  reflect the true influence  of domestic  trade policies  on economic  performance. This
has important implications since most previous analyses of the influence of domestic trade
barriers on economic  performance  have  not utilized  measures  that reflect the combined  influence
of both types of interventions.
B. The Influence  of Governance  Variables  on Economic  Performance
Given the very strong correlations  between the overall WSJ-Heritage  governance  index
and the economic performance measures, Table 2 provides a more detailed analysis of the
influence of the individual components  of this measure.  Here, each of the ten component
governance  indices  were correlated  with the measures  of economic  performance. It should  again
be noted that higher WSJ-Heritage  index values are associated with  "inferior" governance
policies so negative correlations  were expected.  To assist in evaluating  this information,  the
lower portion of the table shows the number of significant  negative correlations between the
governance  indices  and each economic  performance  measure, as well as the average  correlation
value. Similarly,  the right-most  column  in the table shows  the number  of significant  correlations
between each of the performance  variables and the WSJ-Heritage  indices.  These indicate that
banking regulations  and the composite  WSJ-Heritage  Index are significantly  correlated with all
'4However, the tariff and NTB frequency of use measures are highly (negatively) correlated with several of the
performance variables like openness of the economy and the level of GDP per capita, The latter indicates that poorer
countries generally  have higher domestic trade barriers  which may,  in turn,  explain why they failed to achieve
higher income levels.17
of the performance  variables  while wage and price controls are correlated with only three.
Perhaps the key point reflected in Table 2 is that significant  negative correlations  are
generally  observed  between  almost  all of the WSJ-Heritage  governance  indices  and the economic
performance  measures" 5 Trade policy appears to have played a key role in accounting for a
country's level of GDP and speed of integration into the global economy, and has also had a
significant influence  on export and import growth, and the growth of GDP.  In terms of the
number of significant  correlations, domestic trade and policies relating to banking regulations
appear to have had the greatest overall impact  on economic  performance  (respectively,  7 and 8
of the correlations were significant), while wage and price controls had the least important
impact  where only 3 of the correlations  were significant.
Which economic  performance  variables  appear to have been most, or least, affected  by
the governance  policies. The correlation  between the general WSJ-Heritage  index and the level
of GDP per capita (r = -0.613) is the strongest in the table followed  by the speed  of integration
index (r = -0.460) and "openness"  (r = -0.564) measures. The lowest values occurred for the
correlations  with the export and import value growth rates which may be the result of a failure
to differentiate  between  commodity  or energy  exporting  countries  in these tests.  Overall, seven
or more of the correlations between the trade, government intervention, and banking policy
measures and performance  variables are significant  as opposed to five or fewer in the case of
taxation, monetary policy or wage and price control measures.
'5The reader should note that the previous  analysis (Table 1) showed  other variables such as the commodity
composition  of exports and country  size often had a significant  impact on the performance  variables,  yet Table 2
does not account  for the separate  influence  of these factors. These omissions  might  cause the correlations  between
the governance  and performance  measures to understate the real importance  of the former if there is a strong
relationship  between  the WSJ-Heritage  indices and these variables..18
Table  2.  Analysis  of the Correlation  Coefficients Between Governance  Measures  and Economic  Performance  Variables
Economic Performance Variables
General Measures  Export  Growth  Import Growth  Number  of
Significant
Level of GDP  Speed of  Openness  Growth of  Value  Volume  Value  Volume  Correlations
Governance Index Measure  per Capita  Integration  of Economy  GDP  Terms  Terms  Terms  Terms
Overall Governance Index  -0.613*  -0.460*  -0.564*  -0.347*  -0.233*  -0.415*  -0.259*  40.474*  8
Trade Policies  -0.457*  -0.446*  -0.292*  -0.262*  -0.240*  -0.172  -0.337*  -0.423*  7
Policies Concerning Taxation  -0.469*  -0.223*  -0.419*  -0.082  -0.027  -0.326*  -0.064  -0.282*  5
Government Intervention  40.125  -0.419*  40.232*  -0.224*  4.267*  -0.297*  43.243*  43.338*  7
Monetary Policies  -0.363*  -0.083  -0.363*  -0.279*  -0.119  -0.315*  -0.153  43.206*  5
Foreign Investment Regulations  -0.085  -0.335*  -0.204*  -0.210*  -0.281 *  -0.255*  -0.156  -0.271 *  6
Banking Regulations  -0.299*  -0.350*  -0.315*  -0.202*  -0.210*  -0.241 *  -0.243*  -0.367*  8
Wage and Price Controls  -0.192*  -0.186*  -0.331*  -0.149  0.035  -0.038  -0.042  -0.109  3
Security of Property Rights  -0.582*  -0.382*  -0.464*  -0.340*  -0.185  -0.400*  -0.184  43.429*  6
Overall Regulatory Controls  -0.680*  -0.363*  -0.563*  -0.305*  -0.167  -0.398*  -0.107  -0.354*  6
Black Market Index  -0.660*  -0.357*  -0.518*  -0.300*  -0.106  -0.280*  -0.145  -0.368*  6
MEMO ITEMS
No. of Significant Correlations  9  10  11  9  5  9  4  10  --
with Expected Sign
Average Correlation Coefficient  -0.411  -0.396  -0.388  -0.245  -0.163  -0.285  -0.175  -0.329
'This variable takes a value of unity if the share of commodities in total exports exceeds 75 percent.
2This variable takes a value of unity in the share of energy products in total exports exceeds 75 percent.
*Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.19
C. The Combined  Influence  of Trade and Governance  Policies
The previous correlation tests showed a strong significant  relationship  existed between
most of the individual governance and trade policy indices and the performance measures.
Countries  which  adopted  policies  conducive  to industrialization  and growth generally  performed
better that those where such supportive  policies  were absent.  This finding raises the question
of just how much of a country's economic  performance  is attributable  to the combined  influence
of trade and governance  policies  and how much is accounted  for by other factors. For answers,
we employ a regression  model similar to that used by Sachs and Warner (1998) for analyzing
the sources of economic  growth. Our analysis  does, however, differ somewhat  in that we focus
on an alternative  measure of performance  - the World Bank's (1996) index of the speed with
which countries  are integrating  into the global  economy. Our selection  of this new performance
variable was largely based on the  fact that a  number of published studies already show
enlightened  trade policies are linked with higher economic  growth rates, so there appeared to
be little need to further verify this relationship. However, since we include the initial level of
each country's GDP per capita among  the independent  variables  our selection  of the integration
index as performance  variable  the tests should  provide  new insights  concerning  current thinking
on economic "convergence." That is, we attempt to determine whether poorer countries are
integrating  faster into the global  economy  once  one accounts  for the influence  of governance  and20
other policy variables.'6
Our empirical model for investigating these questions is structured as follows:
*  The performance variable
--  The World  Bank  index of  the  speed  of  a  country's  integrating  into the  global
economy.
*  The policy variables
-- The WSJ-Heritage governance index net of its trade policy component. That is, since
we wanted to examine the influence of the later  separately we recalculated the WSJ-Heritage
index to reflect the average of the nine other policy variables.
--  The WSJ-Heritage trade policy index.
--  Other major "policy induced" variables. We felt that one defect of the WSJ-Heritage
index was that it did not adequately reflect governance policies bearing on the development of
"human capital" - a resource which appears to have been a major factor contributing to economic
growth. While various proxies could be used we employed the secondary school enrollment rate
for the population in the relevant age group.  This measure should reflect the extent to which
national policies make continuing education available to the general population.
--  We  also  felt WSJ-Heritage was weak  in  reflecting  governance  policies toward
transport and communications - a number of studies highlight the importance of these factors in
today's  international business environment.  Recently compiled cross-country  surveys provide
information on the number of years  waiting time required for a telephone installation and we
adopted  this  measure  as  a  proxy  for  governance  policies  bearing  on  ease  of  access  to
communication facilities. 17 Unfortunately,  the education and communications measures were
1 6The World Bank (1996, pp. 25-32) conducted  a number of empirical  tests that show lines of causation  run
from: (i) improved governance  policies, to (ii) a faster pace of global integration, to (iii) accelerated  economic
growth and also discussed  the theoretical  bases for these  relations. In one test, the Bank used estimates  by Sachs
and Warner  (1995) of the dates when  countries  established  open policy  regimes  and found  a statistically  significant
increase  in the countries' speed of integration  in the five years after opening  compared  with the five years before
it. The Bank also computed  speed  of integration  indices for 115  countries and showed  that  the growth in GDP per
capita over 1984-93  was significantly  greater  for countries  deemed  to be either "fast"  or "moderate"  integrators  as
opposed  to those whose integration  was held to be "weak" or "slow".
"Statistics on waiting times were drawn from the International  Telecommunications  Union, 1997 World
Telecommunication  Development  Report. For the countries in our sample  these waiting times range from a few
weeks  to over 10 years as in the case of Tanzania, Malawi, Nepal, Syria and Algeria.21
not available  for 5 countries included in Table 1 and 2 correlation results so they had to be
dropped from these further empirical tests.
The structural variables
--  The initial income level as measured  by the log of GDP per capita was chosen. The
rationale here was to make our empirical results comparable  to those of previously  published
"growth" studies. Other analyses show that, once account is taken of  relevant structural
variables, poorer countries tend to grow faster than those with higher incomes. Our approach
should  show  whether  a similar "convergence"  phenomena  is occurring  for the speed  of economic
integration.
-- A dummy variable was added to  identify countries where primary commodities
accounted  for 75 per cent or more of total exports. This variable  was included  given its strength
in the previous correlation  tests.
Variables  reflecting the influence  of external barriers
- The average level of tariffs facing each country's  exports.
--  The NTB coverage ratio for each country's exports. Both measures  were included
to further test the influence  of foreign protectionism  as a constraint to integration,  and to help
assess the validity  of arguments  that external trade barriers are a major constraint  to developing
countries  economic  prospects..
Table 3 presents the results when these variables were tested in a multiple regression
equation. Equation  (1) shows  the policy  and structural variables  account  for over 50 percent of
the variation  in the speed  of integration  index and all take the anticipated  directional  sign.  Four
variables, the composite  WSJ-Heritage  index, the trade policy index, the commodity  export
dummy and the GDP measure are significant at the 99 percent level with the other variables
achieving  significance  at somewhat  lower confidence  levels.22
Table 3
Cross-Country  Regression  Results
(Dependent  Variable  is the Speed  of Integration  into the Global  Economy)
Regression
Explanatory  Variable  1  2  3
Composite  Heritage Index  -0.192  -0.194  -0.203
(2.789)  (2.667)  (2.776)
Heritage Trade Policy  Index  -0.248  -0.248  -0.247
(2.954)  (2.934)  (2.920)
Communications  Waiting  Time  -0.053  -0.053  -0.055
(1.870)  (1.858)  (1.903)
Secondary  Enrollment  Rate  0.007  0.007  0.005
(1.751)  (1.376)  (1.057)
Commodity  Export Dummy  -0.635  -0.644  -0.697
(3.142)  (2.763)  (2.565)
Log of GDP  -0.180  -0.181  -0.157
(2.020)  (2.005)  (1.612)
Foreign Tariff Level  -0.005  -0.017
(0.082)  (0.275)
Foreign NTB Incidence  .007
(0.923)
Standard  Error  0.758  0.754  0.758
R2  0.545  0.546  0.549
Note: T statistics are shown in parentheses23
Two key findings follow from equation (1).  First, the  highly significant negative
coefficients  show  countries  that adopted  less restrictive trade and governance  policies  were able
to globally integrate faster than countries where liberal policies were not implemented. This
conclusion  parallels the findings  of related analyses showing liberal trade policies were closely
correlated with higher economic growth rates. Second, once the influence of  variations in
structural  factors  and national  policies  are accounted  for equation  (1) shows  that poorer countries
are integrating  more rapidly into the global  economy  than others. These findings  of "integration
convergence"  correspond  directly to those relating to economic  growth.
Equations (2) and (3) add the variables on foreign tariffs and nontariff  barriers.  Both
terms fail to achieve statistical  significance,  and the NTB coverage ratio even takes the wrong
directional sign.' 8 As is evident from comparisons  of the R 2 their inclusion  does nothing to
improve the explanatory power of the model. The general message that follows from these
results is that foreign protectionism  appears to be a far less important  constraint to improved
economic  performance  than is the nature  of the national  trade and governance  policies  a country
adopts.
IV. POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  FOR AFRICA
The previous correlation and regression analyses demonstrated that trade and other
government policies directly influence economic performance and the speed of integration.
Countries that pursued less oppressive governance and trade  policies generally achieved
significantly  higher levels of GDP per capita, they had higher trade and economic  growth rates,
'8We also tested  an "African  dummy"  variable in equation  (1) to determine  if countries  in this region were in
some way different. We find no evidence  of this as the dummy  failed to achieve  statistical  significance.24
and were more successful  in integrating  into the global economy. Although  these findings  have
important implications for all developed and developing countries, they raise questions of
particular relevance for Sub-Saharan  Africa (SSA). Sub-Saharan  Africa has been increasingly
marginalized  in both trade and the global economy  over the last two or three decades (Collier
1995 or Ng and Yeats 1997), and the region has a far below average record for almost all
measures of economic performance.' 9 Furthermore, analyses of the external environment
show Africa faces very low tariffs which, due to preferences, are  generally below those
encountered by  other exporters of  the same products and relatively few nontariff barriers
(Amjadi  et. al. 1996). Foreign protectionism  is not responsible  for Africa's sub-par trade and
economic performance. Are Africa's wounds self-inflicted and the result of  inappropriate
domestic  policies? 20 If so, just how much of an improvement  in economic  performance  might
be expected if SSA countries  were to implement  less restrictive national  governance  policies.
For answers, we proceeded  as follows. First, the countries  used in our regression  tests
were split into two groups, namely, Sub-Saharan  African and all other developing  countries.
'9Sub-Saharan  Africa's share of world  trade fell  dramatically  over  the past forty years.  Specifically,  UNCTAD
reports that Sub-Saharan  Africa's share of global exports went from 3.1 percent of global  exports in 1955 to 1.2
percent in 1990  - a decline  that implies  annual trade losses  of roughly  $65 billion  (that is, exports would  have been
$105 billion in 1990  instead  of the actual $40 billion). The most striking feature  of Africa's export performance
since  the early 1960s  is the major erosion  in the region's ability  to compete  in international  markets. For example,
in 1962-64  copper alloys were the region's single largest  commodity  export  with Sub-Saharan  Africa  supplying  32
percent of all OECD imports. By 1991-93,  however, Africa's market  share had dropped more than 22 percentage
points  to less than 10 percent. Similarly,  Africa's market  shares for other key commodities  such as vegetable  oils,
palm oil, palm nuts and kernels, and groundnuts  dropped from 47 to 80 percentage  points below earlier levels.
For the thirty most important  non-oil  exports  combined,  Africa's average  share  declined  by more than 11 percentage
points (from  20.8 percent  to 9.7 percent),  which  implies  annual trade losses  of about $11  billion  (see Ng and Yeats
1997). That figure is almost equal to OECD official  development  assistance  to Africa in 1991  - $10.9 billion.
20See Bauer (1984) for an early and perceptive  analysis of the harm that developing  countries may do to
themselves  through  the adoption  of inappropriate  trade and  commercial  policies. As far as one aspect  of commercial
policy  is concerned,  Amjadi  and Yeats  (1995) show that unsound  African  policies  that greatly  reduced  competition
for transport services greatly elevated  freight costs for exports and has been a major factor behind the erosion of
Africa's trade shares in major  OECD markets.25
We then calculated both the average WSJ-Heritage  trade and composite governance policy
indices for  each group,  along with  their  average speed of  integration indices.  These
computations  showed Africa's overall governance index was about 17 percent higher (more
restrictive)  than the average  for all the other countries  (which  had an index value of 2.88), while
the African trade policy index was about 20 percent above the 3.52 average for non-SSA
countries. Sub-Saharan  Africa, as a region, applies  governance  policies  that are less conducive
to industrialization  and growth  than in almost  all other developing  countries. We also found the
latter had a positive  average  speed  of integration  index  of 0.33 (indicating  they were successfully
integrating  into the global  economy)  - the corresponding  value for Africa (-0.485) was negative,
thereby indicating  that ties between  Africa and the global  economy  were growing at a far slower
pace, or even deteriorating.
We next postulated two different scenarios for change in both the African trade and
composite  governance  policy indices. Under the first, we sought  to determine  the likely impact
of the African countries improving  their governance  policies  sufficiently  to bring their average
index values up to levels of other non-African  countries. Under our second scenario we sought
to determine the likely impact of a one point improvement in the African indices - that is,
lowering  their average  trade policy index  value from 4.23 to 3.23, and overall governance  index
from 3.36 to 2.36. Reductions  of these magnitudes  would  place Africa in a policy  range similar
to that for countries  like Sri Lanka, Panama,  Belize  or Jordan - which  are not exceptional  in any
important  respect.
Under our first scenario (improvement  of Africa's governance indices to the  "other
country" average)  the speed of integration  index for the region is predicted  to rise by more than26
55 percent (to -0.22 from -0.49), but still takes a negative  sign.  Examination  of the regression
coefficients  reported in Table 3 suggests this is due to the fact that most Sub-Saharan  African
countries' exports are highly concentrated  in primary commodities  and exporters  of these goods
appear to be at a disadvantage  in integration  efforts.  However, under the scenario assuming  a
one point improvement  in both the trade and overall  WSJ-Heritage  governance  indices, the SSA
integration index changes from negative to slightly positive. These findings suggest African
governments  have options for reversing the region's long-term marginalization  in the global
economy  by  implementing national  policies  more  conducive  to  improved  economic
performance. 2"
Table 4  examines this  assertion in  more  detail by  providing information on  the
governance practices in  individual African countries.  Shown here are  the  WSJ-Heritage
composite  governance  indices  and, given its strong  relationship  to general economic  performance
(see Table 2), the value of the trade policy index.  In addition, the table also reports some of
the WSJ-Heritage  observations  concerning  trade policy and facilitation  in each country. Finally,
to provide a standard for comparison, the table provides similar information  for Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Taiwan (China) - countries that achieved some of the highest economic and
export growth  rates over the last three decades,  and were also among  the most successful  in their
global  integration  efforts. The latter were chosen since  it has been suggested  that the quality  and
nature of governance  in the East Asian countries  explain why their growth rates were
2"An important  question is what impact  changes in governance  and trade policy indices  might have on some
other economic  performance  variables. For answers, we re-ran the first regression in Table 3 with: (i) GDP per
capita, and (2) the growth in GDP per capita as performance  variables.  Our analysis of the regression  coefficients
suggests  that a one point increase  in the trade and overall  WSJ-Heritage  indices  could raise GDP per capita more
than seven-fold  above its current level (about $500) and raise its annual growth rate by about 4 percentage  points.
The R 2 value for the level of GDP per capita regression  was over 60 percent.27
Table 4. The Quality of Governance and Trade  Policies  in Some Sub-Saharan Countries
Governance  Index
Country  Overall  Trade Policy  General WSJ-Heritage  Observations  on National  Trade Policies
Angola  4.35  5  Angola is virtually  a closed  market. Its market is highly  protected  behind a wall of trade quotas  and import licenses
which are required for all imports.  Corruption  in the customs  service hamper imports.
Burkina Faso  3.50  5  Burkina  Faso maintains  a 5 percent customs, a variable  duty on imports, a 4 percent statistical  tax, among other taxes.
The country  also applies import  bans and quotas.
Cameroon  3.60  5  Cameroon's  average tariff is about 30 percent. Cameroon  also uses countervailing  and anti-dumping  duties to protect
inefficient  domestic  industries. Import licenses  are required and at least 100 items  are subject  to import  quotas.
Chad  3.80  5  Chad's average  tariff is 15.8  percent, but the biggest  deterrent  to trade remains  an unsafe  and un-navigable  road
system. Overall travel  after dark is highly  dangerous.
Congo  3.75  5  Congo's current average tariff is unknown. Tariffs on intermediate  and consumer  goods range from 35 to 50 percent.
The biggest non-tariff  barrier is red tape, an inefficient  customs,  and theft of imported  goods by government  officials.
Djibouti  3.00  4  The largest  barriers to imports  in Djibouti are customs  corruption, inadequate  infrastructure  to bring products to the
country, and poor banking  and financial  services.
Ethiopia  3.60  4+  Ethiopia  applies  a maximum  tariff rate of 80 percent. The customs  bureaucracy  is cumbersome  and inefficient.
Gambia  3.60  4  Gambia's average tariff is 13.5 percent. Some  import  bans are applied.
Ghana  3.10  4+  Ghana's average tariff is 12.5  percent. Handling  and customs  delays  are frequent.
Guinea  3.45  5  Guinea  has a flat tariff rate of 33 percent for almost all imports. Licenses  are required  for 'restricted" goods like
cement, rice, flour and other agricultural  products.
Ivory Coast  3.35  5  The average  tariff rate is 25.5 percent and there are quotas  on some goods.  The are government  monopolies  on
imports  of some goods  and customs  fraud is extensive.
Kenya  3.05  4  Kenya's average tariff is 13.5 percent. The customs  system is prone to corruption. Some  imports  including  sugar,
maize, wheat and milk are banned.
Madagascar  3.24  4+  Madagascar's  average  tariff is 13.5  percent. Other taxes significantly  raise the price of imports.
Malawi  3.55  5  Malawi's average  tariff is 17.6  percent and it imposes  strict import  licenses  on some agricultural  goods.28
Table 4. continued
Governance  Index
Country  Overall  Trade Policy  General  WSJ-Heritage  Observations  on National  Trade Policies
Mali  3.10  3  Mali's average  tariff is 10 percent but the govemnment  also applies a complex  system  of fiscal duties ranging  from 5 to
30 percent. Import licenses  are required.
Mauritania  3.80  5  Mauritania's  average tariff is 20.3 percent  and strict import  inspections  are required.
Mozambique  4.00  3 +  Mozambique's  tariff rates range from 5 to 35 percent. The customs  service is riddled with corruption.
Namibia  2.95  4  Namibia's  average tariff is 24.4 percent.  Imports must have associated  letter of credit.
Niger  3.70  5  Niger's average tariff is 18.3 percent with  some duties as high as 60 percent. Niger maintains  some import  bans.
Nigeria  3.20  5  Nigeria's average  tariff is 18.3  percent and all goods  are subject  further charges  totalling  6 percent. The list of banned
imports  (including  maize, eggs, processed  wood  and textiles) is substantial.
Rwanda  4.20  5  Import tariffs range from 10 to 60 percent.  Rwanda's borders are essentially  closed  due to civil unrest.
Senegal  3.25  5  Senegal's average  tariff is 23.6 percent. It applies import  bans and strict licensing  requirements.
Somalia  4.70  5  Tariffs play a minor role in restricting  imports. A major impediment  is corrupt customs  officials  confiscating  goods.
Sudan  4.20  5  Sudan's average tariff is 24 percent  and imports  of about 30 products are banned.
Tanzania  3.25  3  Tariffs average 8.6 percent.  The major hindrance  to trade is the inefficient  customs system.
Uganda  2.90  4  Tariffs range from 10 to 30 percent. Some  imports  are banned.
Zaire  4.20  4  Tariffs are at moderate  levels and the greatest  barrier to trade is customs  corruption.
Zimbabwe  3.70  5  The average  tariff is 30 percent. Customs  procedures  are complex and some textile and clothing  imports  are banned.
MEMO  ITEM
Hong Kong  1.25  1  Hong Kong levies no import  tariffs  and has very few nontariff  measures. Hong Kong is one of the World's most
Singapore  1.30  1  accessible  markets. Singapore  has exceptionally  low tariffs of 0.3 to 0.5 percent and no nontariff  barriers  to trade.
Taiwan  1.95  2  Singapore's  customs  procedures  are minimal.29
so much greater than those in Africa. 22
Several important  points are reflected in Table 4.  First, for the 28 African countries
included 16 (57 percent) received  the lowest  possible  rating (an index value of 5) for their trade
policies, while an additional 9 (34 percent) received a  "very poor" rating of 4 or higher.
Furthermore, the  trade  policy indices for  all  but  three  of  the  African countries (Mali,
Mozambique  and Tanzania)  were assigned  values  higher than the average  composite  governance
measure. African  policies  relating to trade, therefore, appear  to be even more onerous than the
generally  very repressive  measures  applied in other areas like banking, taxation, or security of
property rights.  In short, both our regression results and information  presented in Table 4
strongly  support the proposition  that a major cause of Sub-Saharan  Africa's poverty and dismal
economic performance lies  in  the  nature of  the policies these nations have imposed on
themselves. 23
'According to the World  Bank  (1997, p. 32) "Governments  enormous  impact  on development  is well illustrated
by contrasting  economic  performance  of developing  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  and East  Asia. In 1960  incomes
per capita in much of East Asia  were only a little higher  than in Africa. Governments  in the two regions were also
similar in size, although  not in composition. African  governments  were already spending  more on consumption,
primarily  on public  employment.  By the mid-1990s,  however,  incomes  in East Asia  were more  than five times  those
in Africa and government  consumption  in Africa, relative  to GDP, had ballooned  to one-and-a-half  times that in
East Asia. The sources of this divergence  are complex,  but it is widely believed  that the superior performance  of
the state in East Asia - the limits it set on its own growth, the soundness  of the policies it adopted, and the
effectiveness  with which it delivered  services - made a powerful  contribution  to the growing  gap in the quality  of
life experienced  by the average  citizen between  these two parts of the world."
23The  World Bank  (1997, p. 14)  reached similar  conclusions  concerning  the functioning  of the state and quality
of governance  policies  in Sub-Saharan  Africa in stating "Many countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa are suffering  from
a crisis of statehood  - a crisis of capability.  An urgent priority is to rebuild state effectiveness  through an overhaul
of public  institutions,  reasserting  the rule of law, and credible  checks  on abuse  of state  power. Where links  between
the state, the private  sector, and civil society  are fragile  and underdeveloped,  improving  the delivery  of public and
collective  services will require closer partnerships  with the private sector and civil society."30
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Economists  generally  argue that the level and structure  of a country's own  trade barriers,
as  well  as  the  "quality"  of  other  government policies,  have  a  major  influence on
industrialization, growth,  and  economic performance.  However,  a  problem previously
encountered in attempts to  test these relations empirically was that few common objective
measures of  the  quality of governance were available across a  wide range  of countries.
Furthermore, comparable  statistics  on tariffs and nontariff  barriers in developing  countries  were
not easily accessible. Several new empirical sources of information  help fill these information
gaps and were used to test the relationships  between economic  performance  and: (i) the quality
of national governance, (ii) the nature and restrictiveness  of a country's own domestic trade
polices, and (iii) the level of foreign trade barriers which a country faces in external markets.
The results show countries adopting less restrictive or  "outward oriented" trade and
governance policies generally achieved significantly  higher levels of GDP per  capita, they
typically  experienced  significantly  higher growth rates for exports, imports and GDP, and also
were more successful in integrating into the global economy.24 Our findings also extended
what is currently known about economic convergence.  Once the influence  of structural and
policy variables  is accounted  for poorer countries  appear to be integrating  faster into the global
24In our opinion an important  conceptual  error has been incorporated  in a few recent studies
that examined  Africa's recent trade performance. Ng and Yeats (1996) show  that the massive
erosion of SSA countries  import shares  in OECD markets implies  annual  export earnings losses
of $65 billion.  In contrast, Rodrik (1998) presents cross-country  regression  using recent data
and argues the, given their present size, African trade is about at expected  levels. This line of
reasoning fails to  recognize that if  Africa had adopted more enlightened economic and
governance  policies over the last three or four decades their economies  would now be larger -
as would their actual trade levels.31
economy  than others.  The message  which follows is that the quality and nature of a country's
own domestic  policies have a major impact  on its rate of development,  integration  and growth.
This point is of paramount  importance.  In international  forums, like the United  Nations  or World
Trade Organization, some developing countries argued that their relatively poor economic
performance  is the result of an unfavorable  external environment. Our findings  provide little
support for this contention.  Protectionism  in foreign markets can reduce trade and economic
growth rates below  otherwise  achievable  levels, but countries  often  have a wide range of options
for offsetting its adverse effects by  adopting governance and trade policies that are more
supportive  of commercial  activity.
This study tested its empirical findings in a "case study" involving  Sub-Saharan  Africa.
Specifically,  it attempted  to determine  if inappropriate  trade and governance  policies  explain  the
relatively  dismal  experience  of Sub-Saharan  Africa as reflected  in almost all available  measures
of achievement  or economic  performance?  The evidence strongly supports this proposition.
Indices of the quality of local governance  show African countries have generally  adopted the
most inappropriate  (restrictive)  fiscal, monetary,  property and wage  policies,  and their own  trade
barriers (including  customs procedures  that are a major constraint  to commercial  activity) are
generally among  the highest of any other regional group.  James Wolfenson, President  of the
World Bank, graphically highlighted the importance of such governance issues in a recent
(January 1998) address to the UN Economic  Commission  for Africa in Addis Ababa.
"But  what do we see when we look at Africa? We see that Africa  is missing  out. Of
$300 billion in total foreign private  capital flows, Sub-Saharan  Africa received about $12
billion.  And of that, only $2.6 billion in direct investments  - a trivial number in relation
to the size and potential of this continent. But we also have to face facts. It is not just32
because the private sector is myopic that less than 1 percent of direct investment comes to
Africa. Africa needs to set itself up to attract  private investment, and that means a clean
regulatory environment, it means a judicial system that works, it means property rights,
corporate law, predictability in taxes and, in relations to governments, it means capacity-
building, health care, and the infra-structure necessary to go along with it. And it means
corruption must be stamped out. Without these, private investors simply will not invest."
The implications  of this assessment, and our findings, are that Africa's most pressing
economic and trade problems will primarily have to be resolved by Africa itself and not by
outsiders. 25 However, a  graphic description by  the World Bank (1997, p.  162) clearly
illustrates  the magnitude  of the problems  many African countries  face in attempting  to improve
the functioning  of their governments  and governmental  policies,
"Achieving  a turnaround  in the effectiveness  of the state [in Sub-Saharan Africa] will
not be easy since the roots of state failure are many and complex.  Chief among them has
been a continuing struggle between traditional forms of governance and social organization
(often based on tribes, lineages, and language and kinship groups) and modern forms of
government.  High military expenditure and dysfunctional behavior of military personnel
(in the absence of other checks and balances) have been important impediments. These have
often reduced the transparency and accountability of public institutions to the extent that
governments have felt a decreasing need to explain and justify their actions to the domestic
population."
Implementing  the needed  improvements  in governance  will require major commitments,
resolve and dedication that many African leaders typically have not exhibited in the past.
However, for past and present problems  to be effectively  addressed  such changes  are clearly of
fundamental  importance.
'The  World Bank (1997, pp. 157-67)  provides  a thoughtful  agenda for improving  the quality  of governance
policies in developing  countries. As a general proposition  it states (p. 157)  that "Efforts  to restart development  in
countries  with inefficient  states must start with institutional  arrangements  that foster  responsiveness,  accountability,
and the rule of law."33
Annex
Profiles of Protection  in Developing  Countries
The regression and correlation tests employed in  this study showed an  important inverse
relationship  generally exists between the restrictiveness  of a country's trade barriers and measures of
economic  performance.  That is, ceterus panbus,  the higher the combined level of national import
barriers the lower the level of its GDP per capita, the slower its rate of export growth and its speed of
global  integration. Although  economic  performance  was shown  to depend  on other factors, such  as those
relating to the overall quality of governance, the finding concerning  the importance  of domestic trade
policies calls for further analysis  of the level and variance  of tariffs and NTBs in developing  countries.
The purpose of this annex is to provide relevant  empirical  information  regarding  this point and to try to
determine if their are common  cross-country  factors influencing  the use of these trade interventions.
Although  trade barrier information  for individual  countries was collected  for this study, and is
presented in the detailed appendix  tables which follow, some aggregation  procedure was needed to help
identify any common underling characteristics  of these trade regimes, and to hold the this annex's
presentation  to manageable  levels. For this purpose a World Bank scheme  that classified  countries  both
by geographic  region and by income level was employed  - see Annex Table 1 for a list of countries in
each group. That is, the 80 individual  countries  for which trade barrier information  was available  were
classified in ten groups like low income African, middle income Africa, or low income Asia.'5  In
addition, a previous World Bank study (Ng and Yeats 1996) identified 14 developing countries that
achieved compound  annual growth rates for non-oil exports that exceeded the corresponding  rate of
growth in world trade by at least one percentage  point over the last three decades.  Given these countries'
superior export performance  there was an obvious interest in determining  whether their domestic  trade
policies were significantly  less restrictive  than those of other countries. As such, the tariff and nontariff
barrier data for these 14 countries  were tabulated  individually  and then aggregated  into a "fast growing
exporters"  country group. 26
A. The Level of Tariffs and Para-Tariffs
Annex Table 2 shows the average tariffs (both including  and excluding  para-tariff  measures)  for
the country groups employed in this analysis. The unweighted  average tariff on all imports  by the 80
developing  countries  is 22.4 percent, with the low income  countries'  tariff (32.2 percent)  averaging  about
14 percentage  points above  that for the middle income  group. 2'  This point was expected  from the
'Several  modifications  were  made  to the  Bank  scheme.  First,  little  or no  trade  regime  information  was  available
for  some  of the  country-income  level  groups  (like  Low  Income  Americas)  so  they  were  not  included  in  our analysis.
Second,  we  have  chosen  not  to report  results  for  regional  breakdowns  of the  high-income  Non-OECD  countries  due
to the  similarities  in their  trade  restrictions.  That  is, the level  of post-Uruguay  Round  tariff  and NTB  protection  in
these  countries  is now  generally  so similar  that  little  would  be gained  by showing  more  disaggregate  data  for these
country  groups.
26These  countries  include:  Republic  of Korea,  Singapore,  Saudi  Arabia,  Bahrain,  Taiwan  (China),  Thailand,
Qatar,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Jordan,  Mexico,  Hong  Kong,  Kuwait  and Papua  New  Guinea.
2 "This difference  is significant  at the 95 percent  level. Table 1 also shows  average  tariffs  and para-tariffs
computed  using  weights  based  on total  imports  of all individual  countries.  As anticipated,  these  are lower  than  the
simple  averages  due to the fact  that, ceterus  paribus,  countries  with  lower  import  duties  would  import  more.34
Annex Table 1
Classification  of Countries  by Region and Income  Levels
Country Group  Countries  Included
Benin, Burkina  Faso, Burundi, Central African  Republic, Cote d'
Low Income Africa  Ivoire, Ethiopia,  Ghana, Guinea,  Kenya, Madagascar,  Malawi,
Mozambique,  Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Middle  Income  Africa  Angola, Cameroon,  Congo, Mauritius, Senegal
Low Income Asia  Bangladesh,  China, India, Nepal, Pakistan,  Sri Lanka
Middle  Income  Asia  Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Thailand
Other European  Countries  Romania,  Turkey, Yugoslavia
Middle East  Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica,
Latin America  Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay,  Peru, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, Venezuela
High Income Non-OECD  Bahamas,  Cyprus, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore,
Taiwan (China), United  Arab Emirates
Republic  of Korea, Singapore,  Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Taiwan
Fast Growing  Exporters  (China), Thailand,  Qatar, Malaysia, Indonesia,  Jordan, Mexico,
Hong Kong, Kuwait and Papua New Guinea.
Source: Drawn from World Bank (1996)35
previous correlations  (Table 1) which show countries with relatively low trade barriers have achieved
significantly  higher levels of GDP per capita.  The standard  deviation for the low income countries'
tariffs (shown in parentheses)  is about 17 percent which indicates  a fairly wide range exists in the level
of import  duties within  this group. Indeed,  analysis  of the underlying  tariffs shows  these may vary from
an average  of about  6 percent in the case of Madagascar  to over 50 percent  for Bangladesh,  Burkina  Faso
and Pakistan  (see the Appendix  Tables which follow).  Regression  tests indicate  that differences  in GDP
per capita can account for about 20 percent of the variation  in developing  countries' average  tariffs.
Unlike the high income non-OECD  countries, Annex Table 2 shows developing  countries rely
far more heavily on para-tariff charges which may take various forms like customs surcharges and
surtaxes, taxes on foreign exchange  transactions, import license fees or consular invoice fees (see Box
Al).  Once the ad valorem equivalents  of these additional  charges  are included  the average incidence  of
developing countries' duties increases to about 30 percent, which is five times the level of all OECD
import charges  and close to 40 percent in the case of the low income  developing  countries.28
On a geographic  basis the Middle East and Eastern European  countries had the lowest average
tariff outside  the high income  non-OECD  group (12.5 percent) followed  by Latin America  (18.1 percent)
and middle income Asia (19 percent). The highest  average tariffs occur in low income Asian countries
(45.8 percent), but this figure does not account for recent substantial  tariff reductions  made by China  and
India. 29 African  import  charges are also well above  average than those in most of the other developing
country  groups.
Annex Table 2 shows that the averages for tariffs plus para-tariffs combined are 3 to  10
percentage  points  higher  than those for tariffs  alone, but no significant  changes  occur in the relative  levels
of protection  in the country groups.3O  The greatest differences  between  the two averages  occur for the
Middle East, Middle  Income Africa, and Low Income Asian countries  where the unweighted  averages
increased  by 10  to 16  percentage  points -the smallest  increase  (3.5 percentage  points) occurred  in Middle
Income Asian  countries. 3'  The table also shows that the tariff and para-tariff  averages  decline
28According  to the  UNCTAD  data  these  special  charges  added  40 percentage  points  to India's  nominal  tariff  of
53 percent,  and more  than  doubled  the incidence  of Costa  Rican,  Iran, Jordan,  Libya,  Madagascar,  Mauritius,
Trinidad  and Tobago,  Turkey  and Zimbabwe's  tariffs.
29An  important  question  is how  do the current  levels  of tariff  protection  in developing  countries  compare  with
those  that were historically  applied  in OECD  markets. A report  by the Carnegie  Foundation  indicates  current
OECD  members  tariffs  averaged  about  40  percent  in the 1940s  which  was  higher  than  most  of the  averages  reported
in Annex  Tables  I and  2. However,  before  the  completion  of the  Kennedy  Round  in 1968,  OECD  tariffs  had  been
reduced  to an average  rate  of about  18  percent  which  was  about  7 points  lower  than  the  average  level  of tariffs  and
para-tariff  protection  in all developing  countries  today.
"The Pearsonian  correlation  coefficient  between  the tariff  and total import  charge  rates was  0.90 which is
statistically  significant  at the 1 percent  confidence  level.
3'A relevant  question  is why  countries  resort  to para-tariffs  instead  of tariffs. Various  factors  appear  to be at
work. Countries  may  apply  customs  surcharges  to help  rectify  temporary  balance  of payments  problems  - as the
United  States  did in the  early  1970s.  Countries  have  also  resorted  to para-tariff  charges  to try and  circumvent  WTO
legal  bindings  on MFN  tariffs,  while  in other  cases  these  charges  are  tied  to the  use  or development  of some  specific
infra-structure  project  like  road or port improvements.36
Annex Table 2.  Average Tariffs and Para Tariffs on All Imports of  Selected Country Groups
Simple Average  Weighted Average
Country Groupa  Tariffsb  Tariffs and Para Tariffsc  Tariffs  Tariffs and Para Tariffs
Low Income Africa  28.4  (13.8)  33.9  (14.6)  23.9  29.1
Middle Income Africa  27.5  ( 8.2)  38.1  (13.1)  25.0  35.8
Low Income Asia  45.8  (21.9)  55.8  (29.5)  39.2  47.7
Middle Income Asia  19.0 (10.7)  22.5  ( 9.6)  17.0  20.9
Other  Europe  12.5 ( 3.2)  17.8 ( 5.2)  11.1  15.6
Middle East  12.5 ( 5.5)  28.6  (30.9)  11.1  23.4
North Africa  25.1  ( 5.1)  32.0  ( 4.0)  21.2  27.9
Latin America  18.1 ( 8.6)  24.4  (15.2)  15.9  21.1
All Low Income Countries  32.2  (17.5)  38.7  (21.0)  27.3  33.2
All Middle Income Countries  18.8 ( 9.2)  26.7  (17.6)  16.6  23.4
All Developing Countries  22.4  (14.8)  29.1  (20.2)  19.4  25.3
Fast Growing Exporters  10.8 ( 9.0)  13.2 (10.2)  10.0  12.6
HighIncome  Non-OECD  9.1  (10.2)  10.0 (11.4)  8.5  9.4
'Country group classifications are based on those in World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries  1995, (Washington:  World Bank,
1995). This table is based on a sample of 80 developing and 23 industrial countries.
bFigures in parenthesis are the standard deviation of the tariff rates within the group.
i'  additional fiscal and other import charges such as stamp taxes,  customs surtaxes,  foreign exchange taxes,  etc.  Figures  in parentheses are  the standard
deviation of the import charges within the group.
Sources: UNCTAD (1987)(1994) and OECD (1996).37
Box Al. UNCTAD's  Classification  Scheme  for Trade barriers  Measures
PARA-TARIFF  MEASURES
1. Customs  Surcharges
2. Additional  Taxes and Charges
- Taxes on Foreign  Exchange  Transactions
- Stamp Taxes
- Import License Fees
- Consular Invoice Fee
- Statistical Taxes
- Taxes on Sensitive Products
- Other Additional Charges
3. Internal  Taxes and Charges
- General Sales Taxes
- Excise Taxes
- Taxes and Charges for Specific  Products
- Decreed Customs Valuation
PRICE CONTROL MEASURES
1. Administrative  Pricing and Minimum  Import Prices
2. Voluntary  Export Price Restraint
3. Variable  Levies or Charges
4. Anti-Dumping  Measures
5. Countervailing  Measures
FINANCE MEASURES
1. Advance  Payment  Requirements
2. Multiple  Exchange  Rates
3. Restrictive  Foreign Exchange  Allocation
4. Regulations  for Terms of Payment
QUANTITY  CONTROL MEASURES
1. Non-Automatic  Licensing
2. Quotas
- Global  Quotas (Allocated  or Unallocated
- Bilateral Quotas
- Seasonal Quotas
- Quotas Linked with  Other Purposes
3. Prohibitions
4. Export Restraint  Arrangements
- Voluntary Export Restraints
- Orderly Marketing Arrangements
- Multifiber Arrangement
5. Enterprise  Specific  Restrictions
MONOPOLISTIC  MEASURES
1. Single Channel  or State Trading
2. Compulsory  National  Services
TECHNICAL  MEASURES
1. Technical  Regulations
2. Pre-Shipment  Inspection
3. Special  Customs  Formalities38
as one moves from lower to higher  income  groups  (Low and Middle  income  Africa is an exception). One
possible  explanation  for this inverse tariff-income  relation is that many low income countries  must rely
more heavily on customs revenues  for state finance since other forms of taxation may be more easily
evaded. Infant  industry  considerations  may also be a factor  here.  As one moves from the middle to low
income countries industries may become "more infantile" and require higher levels of protection to
survive.32
B. Sectoral  Tariffs and Para-Tariff  Protection
A sectorial  analysis  of our tariff statistics  shows  that developing  countries' duties  on manufactured
goods  are generally  higher  than those on any other product  category  with the exception  of foodstuffs  (see
Annex Tables 3 and 4).  For all developing  countries combined tariffs and para-tariffs averaged 30
percent on all manufactured  goods  and are about 8 percentage  points higher  on the "other  manufactures"
group. The latter generally  consists  of labor intensive  items like textiles,  clothing,  footwear,  and leather,
wood  and paper manufactures  which are classified  in Standard  International  Trade Classification  (SITC)
groups 6 and 8.  This sector are also generally afforded  the highest tariff and nontariff protection in
OECD markets. Another common  feature is that developing  countries' countries' tariffs also appear to
"escalate"  or increase sharply as a specific good experiences  further processing  (Yeats 1987)
Annex Table 4 examines the sectorial level of tariff and para-tariff protection for primary
products and also indicates  parallels exist here with the pattern of OECD protection.  Foodstuffs are
among the most highly protected products in all regional groups with the overall developing country
average duty (34 percent) exceeding  that for all manufactures  by 4 percentage points.3  In contrast,
protection for products that are generally employed as manufacturing inputs, like agricultural raw
materials  or ores and metals, typically  have  relatively  low levels of protection  so as not to undermine  the
competitive  position  of their end-use  products.
32Some  developing  countries  made  major  progress  in liberalizing  their  trade  regimes  since  the 1980s,  often  in
the context  of structural  adjustment  reforms  supported  by the World  Bank  (see Nash  and Thomas  1991  for a
discussion).  Comparisons  of data  for the 1980s  (UNCTAD  1987)  with  our current  statistics  show  the  greatest  tariff
reductions  of about  15  to 25 percent  occurred  in Middle  Eastern  countries  and  from  12  to 2 percent  in high  income
non-OECD  countries.  The  latter  decline  was  almost  entirely  due to Singapore  and Hong  Kong's  almost  complete
removal  of all tariffs. Most  of the fast growing  exporters  also  implemented  substantial  reforms  in the mid-1980s
as their tariffs  were  cut  roughly  in half  to the  levels  shown  in Annex  Table  2.  Until  recently  Low  Income  Africa
made  little  progress  in implementing  tariff  reforms.
33As  a result  of the  Uruguay  Round  OECD  nontariff  barriers  on agricultural  products  were  converted  to tariffs  -
often  at very  high  levels. Ingco  (1995)  shows  that  Japan's  "tariffied"  NTBs  provide  levels  of protection  exceeding
200 percent  for wheat  and sugar  and over 500  percent  for rice.  In the European  Union  rice, sugar,  and dairy
products  all  have  levels  of protection  exceeding  200  percent.  United  States  sugar  producers  are  protected  by tariffs
of approximately  200 percent.39
Annex Table  3. Regional  Countries'  Sectorial  Averages  for Tariffs and Para Tariffs on Manufactured  Goods
Transport
All  Equipment  Other
Country Groupa  Manufactures  Chemicals  Iron and Steel  and Machinery  Manufactures
Low Income  Africa  33.8  25.9  25.3  24.8  43.0
Middle Income  Africa  39.2  27.9  33.9  35.0  47.7
Low Income  Asia  58.2  48.9  50.3  48.0  68.5
Middle  Income Asia  24.0  16.7  12.6  20.3  30.3
Other Europe  18.8  14.5  9.7  16.1  23.2
Middle East  30.2  18.0  15.4  20.3  42.2
North Africa  31.9  20.9  16.3  26.6  41.2
Latin America  24.4  15.6  15.2  18.7  34.4
All Low Income  Countries  39.3  31.0  30.9  30.0  48.6
All Middle  Income
Countries  27.8  18.0  16.7  21.7  36.5
All Developing  Countries  29.9  21.4  20.6  23.3  38.1
Fast Growing  Exporters  14.1  10.3  8.9  12.5  16.6
High Income Non-OECD  10.7  8.4  8.3  9.6  11.3
aCountry  group  classifications  are based  on those in World Bank,  Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing  Countries  1995, (Washington:
World Bank, 1995).  See Annex Table 1 for a listing  of the countries  in each group.
Sources: UNCTAD  (1987)(1994)  and OECD (1996).40
Annex Table 4. Regional  Countries'  Sectorial  Averages  for Tariffs and Para Tariffs on Primary  Products
All Primary  Agricultural  Ores and  Mineral  Non-Ferrous
Country Groupa  Products  Foodstuffs  Materials  Metals  Fuels  Metals
Low Income  Africa  33.8  42.1  29.5  23.1  20.9  27.5
Middle Income  Africa  34.9  38.2  32.5  29.2  31.9  34.1
Low Income  Asia  49.2  59.4  41.9  36.5  33.6  45.9
Middle Income  Asia  18.4  24.6  15.9  9.4  14.5  14.8
Other Europe  15.4  23.5  10.6  8.1  10.1  8.3
Middle  East  24.7  34.0  17.7  15.2  14.9  17.1
North Africa  32.1  47.7  19.9  17.2  15.1  20.2
Latin America  21.7  27.9  17.4  16.0  16.0  14.8
All Low Income  Countries  37.2  45.9  32.3  26.1  23.7  31.6
Middle Income  Countries  23.9  31.5  18.7  16.1  16.9  17.5
All Developing  Countries  26.8  34.0  22.2  18.5  18.3  21.3
Fast Growing  Exporters  10.5  13.4  8.9  6.5  9.0  8.9
High Income  Non-OECD  8.2  8.4  8.1  7.0  7.5  8.0
aCountry  group  classifications  are  based on those in World Bank, Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing  Countries  1995, (Washington:
World Bank, 1995). See Annex Table 1 for a listing of countries in each group.
Sources: UNCTAD  (1987)(1994)  and OECD (1996).41
C. The Importance  of Nontariff  Trade Measures
In addition to tariffs and other import  charges, countries  often apply different types of nontariff
measures (NTMs) to  imports (see Box Al  for a listing). 34 UNCTAD compiled one of the most
comprehensive  databases  on these  measures,  which are applied  at the tariff line level, and often  was able
to match this information  with actual trade data.  However, there are important limitations of the
UNCTAD  database in that it does not provide any information  on a measure's nominal equivalent,  nor
does it provide any indication  of changes  in the intensity  of application. If, for example, quantitative
restrictions are eased to permit increased imports this would not be reflected in UNCTAD's statistics
which only indicate  whether or not an NTM is applied.  Similarly, if the administration  of health and
safety  regulations,  or technical  standards,  becomes  more, or less, rigorous  this fact would  not be reflected
in the databasge Third, no information  is available  on measures  like export subsidies  or special  export
rebates that might be considered  nontariff "distortions"  to trade.  These types of export incentives  have
been a major source of contention,  particularly  in agriculture  (wheat, sugar and dairy products) as well
as ferrous metals.  These limitations  are probably the reason why the previously  reported correlations
between the NTM indices and the economic performance measures were generally weak or  not
statistically  significant.
For empirical  analyses  involving  NTM inventories  several  summary  indices  have  been  used. One
measure is a frequency  index (Fl) showing  the percentage  of tariff lines covered by some pre-selected
group of nontariff  measures. This index (Fl) is defined  by,
(A.1)  Fj  =  (EDiN,  N) * 100
where N, is tariff line i, Di is a dumnmy  variable that takes a value of unity if one or more NTMs is
applied  to the item or zero otherwise,  and N, is the total number  of tariff lines  in the product  group. The
above  summation  is made over all countries  exporting  to the importing  country  j.3  This index was
34As Baldwin  (1970)  and Walter  (1972)  show  the problem  of defining  what  measures  constitutes  a nontariff
barrier  and  what  measures  do not  has  been  more  difficult  than  many  might  suppose.  Laird  and  Yeats  (1990)  outline
the methodologies  used for estimating  NTM  ad valorem  equivalents  and also provide  information  on how the
UNCTAD  NTM  database  was  constructed.  The latter  source  also  provides  information  on previous  applications
of the database  in research  and  policy  studies.
351f  matched  tariff-line-level  import  data  are  available,  in which  individual  countries  of origin  for shipments  are
identified,  a second  index  showing  the share  of total imports  subject  to NTMs  can be computed. This trade
coverage  measure  (Ci)  is defined  as,
(A.2)  Cj =  ((EDitm  *  V  x 100
where  Vi,,-n  represents  the  value  of imports  in tariff-line  item  i in year (t-n),  and D,, is a dummy  variable  that  takes
a value  of unity  if an NTM  is applied  to the item  and zero  otherwise.  If n and m are zero  the index  is based  on
current  trade values,  otherwise  it is expressed  in a base year trade  weights.  In some cases  they  may  be quite
misleading  in this  respect. For example,  no trade  may  occur  because  of a highly  restrictive  NTM  - in which  case
the  coverage  ratio  would  be zero. The  frequency  measure  (equation  A.  1) would  not be so affected  which  is why
economists  may  compare  the results  from  the two indices. Note,  that frequency  indices  assign  all traded  goods
equal  weights.  That  is, an NTM  on (say)  umbrellas  would  be treated  the same  as one on automobiles.42
Annex Table 5. Average  Tariffs plus Para Tariffs and Nontariff Barrier  Frequency  Ratios  for Sectorial  Groups  of Developing  Countries
Average  Tariff plus Para Tariffs  NTM Frequency Ratio
All  Primary  All  All  Primary  All
Country Groupa  Items  Products  Manufactures  Items  Products  Manufactures
Low Income Africa  33.8  33.8  33.8  39.0  40.0  38.6
Middle Income  Africa  38.1  34.9  39.2  13.7  11.0  14.4
Low Income  Asia  55.8  49.2  58.2  23.7  24.8  23.1
Middle Income  Asia  22.5  18.4  24.0  10.1  12.3  9.2
Other Europe  17.8  15.4  18.8  41.9  43.5  41.1
Middle  East  28.6  24.7  30.2  26.6  28.6  25.8
North Africa  32.0  32.1  31.9  25.1  33.2  21.8
Latin America  24.4  21.7  24.4  14.6  17.1  13.4
All Low Income  Countries  38.7  37.2  39.3  35.6  36.6  35.1
All Middle Income  Countries  26.7  23.9  27.8  18.7  21.1  17.7
All Developing  Countries  29.1  26.8  29.9  23.5  25.6  22.6
Fast Growing Exporters  13.2  10.5  14.1  5.7  11.0  3.6
High Income Non-OECD  10.0  8.2  10.7  9.4  14.1  7.6
'Country  group  classifications  are based  on those in World Bank,  Global  Economic  Prospects  and  the Developing  Countries  1995, (Washington:  World  Bank,
1995). See Annex Table I for a listing  of the countries in each group.
Sources:  UNCTAD  (1987)(1994)  and OECD (1996).43
employed  in our correlation  tests (see Table 1).
Annex Table 5 shows NTM frequency indices  for the 14 country groups which were computed
using entries  for the so called "hard core" measures  whose  intent is normal  the restriction  of trade. These
are measures like quotas, variable import levies, or restrictive licensing arrangements.  We have,
however,  excluded  some  NTMs like health  and sanitary  requirements  which  may  be applied  for legitimate
social reasons.  The NTM ratios were computed for all items as well as for primary products and
manufactures  separately. Finally, the table also shows average nominal  protection  from all tariffs and
paratariff  charges. The intention  here is to provide  some initial indication  on the  joint (complementary
or offsetting)  use of nontariff measures and from import charges.  Annex Table 8 will address this
question  in more detail.
Several important  points are evident from these statistics. First, there is considerable  variation
in the value of NTM  frequency  ratios  which suggests  important  differences  exist in reliance  on these  types
of interventions  across the country groups.  Low Income African countries and the "Other Europe"
register the highest  frequency  of NTB use with about  40 percent of all tariff line items affected  by these
measures.36 This ratio is about two and one-half  times higher than that for the high income non-OECD
countries  and about  six to seven times higher than in the fast growing exporters  group. 37
Second, an analysis  of the underlying  data shows  that quantitative  restrictions  (QRs)  are the most
widely applied type of NTM used by developing countries.  Quantitative restrictions are applied to
approximately  30 percent  of all Low Income  African  imports,  while  about  9 percent of imports  encounter
some other nontariff measures. 38 For all developing  countries combined  the QR ratio on all imports
(18.3 percent) is only 5 points lower than that for all forms of  nontariff measures. Quantitative
restrictions  constitute  over 90 percent of the nontariff  measures  applied  in 6 of the 14 country  groups  and
at least 75 percent of the measures  employed in all of the groups with one exception  (Other Europe).
This point  has important  (negative)  efficiency  implications,  particularly  with regard  to the effects  of tariffs
36The  relatively  high  ratio  for the  countries  classified  in "other  Europe"  is largely  due  to Turkey  which  applies
customs  surcharges  and QRs  to some  major  imports.
37The  OECD  ratios  reported  in Annex  Table  4 reflect  the situation  prior to the Uruguay  Round  and there  is
every  indication  that they  will  be significantly  reduced  as a result  of the negotiations.  Specifically,  the Round
achieved  agreement  that  all  forms  of nontariff  barriers  applied  to agricultural  products  would  be converted  to tariffs
while  all "voluntary"  export  restraints  (VERs)  would  be  eliminated.  In addition,  all  nontariff  barriers  imposed  under
the  Multifiber  Arrangement  (MFA)  would  be phased  out over  a ten  year  period.  As a result,  Low  and  Yeats  (1  995)
estimate  that  the 17  percent  OECD  NTM  frequency  index  shown  in Annex  Table  4 will  fall  to 3 to 4 percent  once
the Uruguay  Round  agreement  is fully  implemented.
38The  problem  of "stacking"  or the multiple  application  of different  types  of NTMs  on a single  product  could
potentially  complicate  these  comparisons.  For  example,  if price  control  measures  were  also  applied  to a high  share
of the  items  facing  QRs  a comparison  of the  results  presented  in Annex  Tables  6 and  7 would  cause  the importance
of the former  to be understated.  As an example,  US sugar  and beef imports  recently  faced  both a quota  and a
variable  levy.44
Annex Table 6. Regional  Countries'  Sectorial  Average  Nontariff  Barrier  Ratios  for Primary Products
All Primary  Agricultural  Ores and  Mineral  Non-Ferrous
Country Groupa  Products  Foodstuffs  Materials  Metals  Fuels  Metals
Low Income  Africa  40.0  45.9  36.4  30.8  35.9  35.2
Middle  Income Africa  11.0  13.6  10.6  5.4  5.9  10.8
Low Income  Asia  24.8  29.8  23.6  16.8  31.1  11.0
Middle  Income Asia  12.3  20.2  5.0  4.1  15.1  0.7
Other Europe  43.5  44.0  46.2  40.1  32.0  47.6
Middle East  28.6  36.4  24.8  18.1  29.9  14.4
North Africa  33.2  58.5  7.7  6.8  34.1  6.9
Latin America  17.1  26.7  10.1  3.5  17.3  6.0
All Low Income  Countries  36.6  42.3  33.6  27.7  34.8  29.8
Middle  Income Countries  21.1  30.6  13.9  8.9  20.5  10.0
All Developing  Countries  25.6  33.8  19.9  14.8  25.2  16.2
Fast Growing  Exporters  11.0  19.8  3.9  2.9  9.4  2.6
High Income Non-OECD  14.1  23.3  7.1  4.5  18.5  4.7
aCountry  group  classifications  are based  on those in World Bank, Global  Economic  Prospects  and  the Developing  Countries  1995, (Washington:
World Bank, 1995).  See Annex  Table 1 for a listing  of the countries in each group.
Sources: UNCTAD  (1987)(1994)  and OECD  (1996).45
Annex Table 7. Regional  Countries'  Sectorial  Average  Nontariff  Barrier  Ratios Manufactured  Goods
All  Transport  Other
Country Groupa  Manufactures  Chemicals  Iron and Steel  Equipment  Manufactures
and Machinery
Low Income  Africa  38.6  33.1  37.8  36.8  42.0
Middle  Income  Africa  14.4  8.3  14.1  12.0  18.4
Low Income  Asia  23.1  18.6  27.4  14.5  29.0
Middle  Income  Asia  9.2  9.0  7.6  16.0  6.0
Other Europe  41.1  34.4  60.6  40.2  42.2
Middle  East  25.8  22.2  18.5  26.9  27.7
North Africa  21.8  17.2  6.0  13.4  30.0
Latin America  13.4  10.7  9.5  7.6  18.0
All Low Income  Countries  35.1  29.9  35.5  31.9  39.1
Middle Income  Countries  17.7  14.3  14.2  15.0  20.9
All Developing  Countries  22.6  19.0  20.5  20.1  25.6
Fast Growing  Exporters  3.6  4.7  4.8  3.5  3.3
High Income  Non-OECD  7.6  9.1  5.9  9.4  6.6
aCountry  group  classifications  are based  on those in World  Bank, Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing  Countries  1995, (Washington:
World Bank, 1995). See Annex Table 1 for a listing of the countries  in each group.
Sources: UNCTAD  (1987)(1994)  and OECD (1996).46
and some other forms of nontariff  restrictions. 39
A more disaggregate  analysis of the incidence  of NTMs (Annex Tables 6 and 7) shows that
foodstuffs  and the "other manufactures"  group (the latter is largely composed  of goods that are labor
intensive  in production)  generally  have the highest frequency  of NTB application. About 45 percent of
low income  Africa's and other Europe's imports  of foodstuffs  encounter  NTMs which the ratio for North
Africa approaches  60 percent (Annex Table 6).  About  40 percent of the low income  countries imports
in the other manufactures  group face NTMs which is about  5 points higher than the corresponding  ratio
for all manufactured  goods  (Annex Table 7).
NTM use in developing  countries is considerably  higher than that in OECD members, but the
sectorial  distribution  of these measures' application  is generally  similar.  Perhaps the largest difference
occurs for the mineral  fuels group where approximately  25 percent of all developing  countries' imports
encounter  some  form of restriction  (Annex  Table 6) while  the corresponding  ratio for the OECD  countries
is under 3 percent.
Does NTM protection  generally substitute  for, or reinforce, protection  by tariff and paratariff
charges. The evidence  from Annex Table 5 provided  some evidence  in support  of the latter proposition
since low  income  countries  higher  than average  import  charges  and relatively  high NTM  frequency  ratios.
Annex Table 8 provides a different perspective  on this question by first classifying  countries in three
groups, that is those with low, medium, and high tariffs (see the first column) and then further assigns
these countries to one of three groups based on a low, medium or high frequency of NTN use. This
cross-classification  is helpful  in showing  how  developing  countries  jointly apply  these  trade interventions.
The profiles that emerge from Annex Table 8 reveal considerable  variation  in the use of these
trade restrictions across individual  countries.  One group of about 21 developing  countries (Angola,
Argentina,  Bahrain, etc.) has set both tariffs and NTBs at relatively high levels which would reinforce
each measure's protective  effects. However, there are a number  of cases where NTB protection  appears
to substitute  for tariffs (countries  like Cyprus, Ecuador, Guinea, etc.) or where high tariffs are applied
with few NTBs (Bahamas, Burundi, etc.).  In short, what Annex Table 8 shows is that individual
developing countries apply these restrictions in  a  variety  of  different ways - sometimes in  a
complementary  and sometimes  in an offsetting  fashion.
This latter finding concerning  the wide variation  in the ways individual  countries  utilize tariffs
and NTBs  has important  implications  for future empirical  tests of the relationship  between  trade policies
and growth. Empirical  analyses  that correlate  (say) rates of GDP growth with either: (i) tariff levels, or
(ii) some index of NTM usage have generally  produced  weak or even non-significant  results.  Our data
39As noted  that there is reason  to believe  the detrimental  impact  of quantitative  restrictions  and some  other
NTMs  is considerably  greater  than  that of tariffs.  Specifically,  if foreign  producers  become  increasing  efficient
relative  to domestic  suppliers  in developing  countries  they  may  be able  to erode  a tariffs  protective  effects  over  time.
This  would  increase  developing  countries'  nationals'  access  to lower  cost  foreign  products,  which  would  improve
living  standards  and the regions  ability  to compete  in foreign  markets. Under  quotas  and other quantitative
restrictions,  however,  no such  beneficial  adjustment  is possible  as the  volume  of goods  that can  be imported  are
subject  to fixed  ceilings. Instead  of potentially  narrowing,  as in the case  of tariffs,  the gap between  developing
countries  that  use  these  measures  standard  of living  and  production  efficiency  would  further  worsen  relative  of other
countries.47
Annex Table 8. The Relation Between Average Tariffs and Nontariff Measures in 80 Developing Countries.
Nontariff  Measure  Frequency  Index (%)  Number  Average
Average  of  Tariff
Tariff Level  Low (under 10%)  Medium  (10 to 20%)  High (Over 20%)  Countries  Rate
Low  Angola, Argentina,  Bahrain,  Bolivia, Chile,  El Salvador,  Jordan  Cyprus, Ecuador, Guinea,
Tariffs  Colombia,  Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Korea,  Haiti, Nicaragua,  Syria, Taiwan  33  9.2%
(under 10%)  Kuwait, Madagascar,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  (China), Turkey, Yugoslavia
Oman, Papua  New Guinea, Qatar, Romania,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal,  Singapore, U.A.E.
Medium  Algeria,  Brazil, Cote d' Ivoire, Guatemala,  Guyana, Libya,  Cameroon, Ghana, Iran,  25
Tariffs  Indonesia,  Jamaica, Nepal, Paraguay,  Uganda, Uruguay  Malawi, Morocco,  18.2%
(15 - 25%)  Thailand, Venezuela  Mozambique,  Peru, Philippines,
Trinidad & Tobago, Yemen,
Zaire, Zimbabwe
High  Bahamas,  Burundi,  Central African Rep.,  Benin, China,  Bangladesh,  Burkina Faso,  22  35.6%
Tariffs  Congo, Nigeria, Somalia,  Sri Lanka,  Pakistan,  Sudan  Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Kenya,




Countries  39  10  31
Average
NTM Ratio  2.9%  13.9%  52.4%48
indicate  a measure that reflects the way tariffs or NTBs are being employed  jointly (as does the WSJ-
Heritage trade policy index)  must be used in such analyses  if the results are to be einpirically  valid.49
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Appendix Tables53
Table A.l: Weighted  and Unweighted  Average  Tariffs  /a and Total  Import  Charges  /b for All
Products  in  80  Developing  Countries
Unwgt Unwgt  Ave  Import  Imp Wgt  Unwgt  Imp Wgt  Populat-  GDP  GDP Per
Ave  Para+  Wgt Ave  Para+  Ave All  Ave All  ion 1994  1994  Capita
80  LDCs  /c  Tariffs  Tariffs  Tariffs  Tariffs  NTMs  NTMs  (Mill)  ($  Mill)  1994  ($)
1  Benin  **  37.4  49.4  30.7  42.2  17.0  31.1  5.3  1522  287.2
1  Burkina Faso *  60.8  76.8  52.8  67.5  80.6  86.8  10.1  1856  183.8
1  Burundi  36.9  37.9  28.9  29.9  0.3  0.8  6.2  1001  161.5
1  Centr Afr Rep **  32.0  39.3  26.7  33.7  5.1  16.7  3.2  872  272.5
1  Cote d'Ivoire  **  23.3  25.3  21.5  22.9  6.6  20.6  13.8  6716  486.7
1  Ethiopia  29.6  31.2  23.2  24.7  22.5  16.7  54.9  4688  85.4
1  Ghana  **  29.6  33.0  29.3  31.0  48.4  38.4  16.6  5421  326.6
1  Guinea  **  8.9  8.9  8.4  8.4  38.2  39.9  6.4  3395  530.5
1  Kenya  43.7  44.7  36.8  37.8  37.8  29.8  26.0  6860  263.8
1  Madagascar  6.1  40.1  5.5  36.0  1.7  1.7  13.1  1918  146.4
1  Malawi  15.2  15.2  13.1  13.1  91.3  91.8  9.5  1302  137.1
1  Mozambique  15.6  25.6  14.5  24.5  56.9  61.0  15.5  1467  94.6
1  Nigeria  32.8  39.8  26.5  33.5  8.8  7.6  108.0  35200  325.9
1  Sierra  Leone  **  25.8  25.8  21.8  21.8  100.0  100.0  4.4  843  191.6
1  Somalia  **  30.8  31.0  24.6  24.8  6.3  13.0  8.8  917  104.2
1  Sudan **  56.6  56.6  47.0  47.0  10.0  8.0  27.4  5989  218.6
1  Tanzania  29.8  29.8  22.8  22.8  79.7  80.4  28.8  3378  117.3
1  Uganda  **  19.9  19.9  18.1  18.1  13.9  19.7  18.6  4001  215.1
1  Zaire  20.7  20.7  17.1  18.2  100.0  100.0  42.5  8769  206.3
1  Zambia  **  29.9  29.9  25.8  25.8  0.0  0.1  9.2  3481  378.4
1  Zimbabwe  10.1  30.1  7.6  27.6  93.6  97.4  10.8  5432  503.0
2  Angola  **  11.6  20.6  11.2  20.0  0.7  2.2  10.4  7287  700.7
2  Cameroon  **  32.0  42.2  27.0  37.0  20.7  15.3  13.0  7470  574.6
2  Congo **  32.0  33.2  26.7  28.7  4.6  5.3  2.6  1578  606.9
2  Mauritius  27.6  60.3  30.1  63.2  35.2  34.8  1.1  3385  3077.3
2  Senegal  **  34.2  34.2  29.8  29.9  7.2  14.9  8.3  3881  467.6
3  Bangladesh  81.2  83.2  65.1  67.1  49.4  55.1  117.9  26164  221.9
3  China  37.5  37.5  30.6  30.6  11.3  26.4  1190.9  522172  438.5
3  India  53.0  95.2  42.6  76.6  62.6  61.3  913.6  293606  321.4
3  Nepal  16.1  16.1  16.8  16.8  0.7  0.8  20.9  4048  193.7
3  Pakistan  61.1  73.3  56.2  68.7  14.5  24.7  126.3  52011  411.8
3  Sri Lanka  26.1  29.2  23.7  26.1  3.8  11.2  17.9  11712  654.3
4  Indonesia  17.0  20.1  12.6  16.3  2.7  7.3  190.4  174640  917.2
4  Korea  11.1  12.3  10.0  14.1  2.6  29.8  44.5  376505  8460.8
4  Malaysia  12.8  17.6  11.2  15.4  2.1  5.1  19.7  70626  3585.1
4  Papua N Guinea  **  7.0  14.2  6.3  13.1  2.6  1.3  4.2  5403  1286.4
4  Philippines  **  28.1  33.1  24.8  29.8  44.9  63.6  67.0  64162  957.6
4  Thailand  37.8  37.8  36.9  36.9  5.5  8.2  58.0  143209  2469.1
5  Romania  **  16.7  16.7  13.6  13.6  0.0  0.1  22.7  30086  1325.4
5  Turkey  9.0  24.7  9.0  22.1  96.4  89.7  60.8  131014  2154.8
5  Yugoslavia  11.8  12.0  10.8  11.0  29.2  33.6  4.8  14017  2920.2
6  Bahrain  **  7.1  7.1  7.2  7.2  1.5  3.5  0.6  4548  7580.0
6  Iran **  20.7  100.9  15.1  70.1  99.3  98.8  62.5  63716  1019.5
6  Jordan  **  13.8  28.0  13.7  27.1  12.9  16.8  4.0  6105  1526.3
6  Oman **  2.9  2.9  2.1  2.1  3.6  4.0  2.1  11628  5537.1
6  Saudi Arabia  12.1  12.1  12.0  12.1  3.9  8.0  17.8  117236  6586.3
6  Syria  *  14.8  27.5  12.6  24.5  36.6  36.2  13.8  35502  2572.6
6  Yemen  *  16.2  22.0  15.1  20.5  28.7  34.6  14.8  3884  262.4
7  Algeria  22.9  24.9  16.4  18.9  9.5  6.9  27.4  41941  1530.7
7  Egypt  33.5  33.5  22.9  22.9  45.2  49.9  56.8  42923  755.7
7  Libya  **  18.3  34.7  20.7  36.5  10.3  9.4  5.2  20623  3966.0
7  Morocco  **  23.5  36.1  22.1  34.6  27.6  39.7  26.4  30803  1166.8
7  Tunisia  27.5  30.6  24.0  26.7  32.7  42.5  8.8  15770  1792.0
8  Argentina  10.6  19.4  9.7  16.6  0.2  3.1  34.2  281922  8243.3
8  Bolivia  16.7  16.7  16.5  16.5  2.0  3.5  7.2  5506  764.7
8  Brazil  13.2  15.4  14.7  16.7  1.5  14.3  159.1  554587  3485.8
8  Chile  10.9  19.9  10.7  21.2  0.1  0.4  14.0  51957  3711.2
8  Colombia  11.8  11.8  11.7  11.7  1.7  2.3  36.3  67266  1853.154
8  Costa Rica  **  21.1  61.7  16.4  37.2  0.8  4.1  3.3  8281  2509.4
8  Ecuador  9.3  11.2  8.2  10.2  63.6  52.2  11.2  16556  1478.2
8  El Salvador**  21.1  21.1  15.8  15.8  19.2  10.7  5.6  8116  1449.3
8  Guatemala  *  22.8  22.8  17.3  17.3  7.4  13.1  10.3  12929  1255.2
8  Guyana  **  17.4  17.5  16.3  16.4  16.0  15.5  0.8  540  675.0
8  Haiti  **  11.6  16.8  10.3  14.6  30.8  27.6  7.0  1632  233.1
8  Jamaica  **  17.3  17.5  16.2  16.7  6.6  16.7  2.5  4241  1696.4
8  Mexico  13.4  16.9  12.3  15.8  3.9  19.0  88.5  377115  4261.2
8  Nicaragua  **  22.1  24.6  17.1  19.6  27.8  26.5  4.2  1833  436.4
8  Paraguay  15.4  15.4  12.9  12.9  1.8  4.6  4.8  7826  1630.4
8  Peru **  48.9  66.3  39.4  56.1  53.4  55.5  23.2  50077  2158.5
8  Trinidad  & To **  17.3  43.1  16.2  41.6  23.4  33.5  1.3  4792  3686.2
8  Uruguay  **  27.5  28.5  26.6  27.6  14.1  20.6  3.2  15539  4855.9
8  Venezuela  16.4  17.4  14.6  16.2  2.4  2.8  21.2  58257  2748.0
9  Bahamas  **  32.3  33.8  31.6  33.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  3375  11250.0
9  Cyprus  *  17.5  23.5  13.9  19.9  32.2  47.5  0.7  7189  10270.0
9  Hong Kong  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.9  6.1  131881  21619.8
9  Kuwait  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.2  3.5  6.7  1.6  24289  15180.6
9  Qatar  *  4.2  4.2  4.3  4.3  1.3  1.2  0.6  7661  12768.3
9  Singapore  0.4  0.4  1.9  1.9  0.3  0.7  2.9  68949  23775.5
9  Taiwan, China  9.7  9.7  7.4  7.4  35.9  27.4  21.0  241014  11476.9
9  United  Arab  Em.  4.5  4.5  4.3  4.3  1.0  0.5  2.4  35405  14752.1
Notes:  /a Based on available  MFN tariffs or applied rates.
/b Include additional  fiscal and other  import  charges.
/c Countries  with  **  are the late 1980s tariffs,  where  country classifications  are:  l=Low income  Afr
2 - Middle  Income Africa,  3 =  Low income Asia,  4  - Middle  income Asia,  5 =  Other  Europe,
6 - Middle  East, 7 =  North Africa,  8 - Latin America,  9 - High  Income  Non-OECDs.
Sources: UNCTAD,  Directory  of Trade  Regimes,  1994 and Handbook  of Trade  Control Measures  of Developing
Countries,  1987; GATT/WTO,  Trade  Policy  Review, various  issues,  1990-95, and World  Bank,  WDR 1996.55
Table  A.2:  Trends  in  Average  Tariff  levels  for  80 Developing  Countries  (Unweighted  in  %)
80 LDCs  (Sources)  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
1  Benin  /b,p  48.3  47.5  37.4  37.8  42.0  40.3  40.0  41.6  13.1
1  Burundi  /a  37.9  37.0  36.9  7.4
1  Cote  dl'voire  /c,b,d,f,p  30.8  28.7  27.2  26.3  26.6  26.4  26.0  23.3  25.0  30.6  25.8  23.6  22.0  20.0
1  Ethiopia  /a  29.0  29.6  16.3
1  Ghana  /a,c,d  43.3  30.0  30.0  30.0  20.0  23.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  15.0  12.5
1  Guinea  /a,p  76.4  8.9  8.2  13.0  10.8
1  Kenya  /b,c,d  40.3  41.7  39.2  39.2  41.7  37.5  43.7  34.0  33.6  22.0  13.5
1  Madagascar  /a,b  6.0  6.1  7.3
1  Malawi  /a,b,d,p  21.9  19.6  16.7  25.5  16.7  15.2  16.1  16.3  19.9  21.0  25.3
1  Mauritania  /o,p  23.6  25.5  23.1  19.0  19.2  17.0  33.0  31.4  20.3
1  Nigeria  /a,c,d  32.6  35.0  23.8  35.0  34.3  36.4  32.8  29.0
1  Rvanda  /e  33.0  42.0  34.8
1  Sierra  Leone  /a,b  25.8  25.8  25.8  41.0  39.5  21.0
1  Somalia  /b,o  35.0  30.8  23.2
1  Sudan  /a,o  50.6  56.6  43.0  24.0
1  Tanzania  /a.d  23.9  32.1  29.8  28.2  29.7  33.0  27.5  27.5  19.5
1  Uganda  /b,c.e  30.0  19.9  17.1  13.2
1  Zaire  /a.b,d  23.6  23.8  22.4  22.4  20.7  24.7  34.1
1  Zi  uabwe  /a,c,h  10.0  8.7  8.9  10.1  17.2  17.2  21.8
2  Cameroon  /b,c,p  28.3  32.0  18.8  18.8  18.1
2  Mauritius  /a,p  34.9  35.8  37.9  41.7  39.5  27.6  29.0  29.0
2  Senegal  /c.h  5.0  15.0  12.6  10.0  15.0  15.0  12.3  12.6  12.6
2  South  Africa  /c,d  29.0  22.0  20.0  13.9  8.8
3  Bangladesh  /a,c,d  99.9  81.8  102.2  94.0  71.0  50.0  42.0  27.4
3  China  /a,d  49.5  38.1  39.5  40.3  42.9  39.9  36.3  23.9
3  India  /a,e,h  74.3  100.0  98.8  79.2  53.0  47.8  47.8  33.4
3  Nepal  /a,e  22.1  21.0  22.6  16.1  11.0
3  Pakistan  /c,d,e,g  77.6  77.0  77.0  77.0  66.0  68.9  69.0  65.0  64.8  66.0  61.1  56.0  51.0  41.7
3  Sri  Lanka  /a,b,d  41.3  31.0  27.3  27.3  26.9  25.0  24.2  26.0  20.0
4  Indonesia  /a,c,d  29.0  37.0  27.0  31.5  18.1  22.0  20.3  20.0  19.4  17.0  13.2
4  Korea  /b,c  23.7  23.7  21.9  22.9  18.1  12.7  11.4  11.4  10.1  8.9  9.1
4  Malaysia  /a,c,h  10.6  15.8  13.6  13.0  12.8  14.3  13.0  9.1
4  Philippines  /c  41.4  34.6  31.4  29.5  28.8  27.6  27.9  27.9  27.9  27.6  27.8  26.0  24.3  22.6  21.7  20.0  14.3
4  Thailand  /c  32.3  41.2  40.8  37.8  23.3  23.1
S  Czech  Rep.  /h,i,j  6.2  6.2  5.3  4.8  4.8
s  Hungary  /c,e,h  24.0  24.0  15.0  15.0  12.6  8.5  8.5
5  Poland  /c,h  10.9  10.9  18.3  11.7  11.7  8.5  8.5
5  Romania  /b,c  16.7  16.3  12.3  6.0
5  Turkey  /a,c,g  40.0  22.0  24.7  31.4  26.6  22.7  9.0  10.0
S  Yugoslavia,  PR /a,b,e  12.0  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8
6  Bahrain  /b,o  1.7  7.1  3.0  4.0
6  Iran  /a  20.7  20.7
6  Israel  /c,m  8.0  9.4  7.5  6.9  7.1  8.3  6.1
6  Jordan  /m  15.9  13.2  13.8  14.3  14.5  14.2  17.2  17.6  18.3  14.0  12.2  14.6  20.5  16.0
6  Oman  /b,o  1.5  2.9  3.5  2.5  5.7  6.0
6  Saudi  Arabia  /a,o  1.9  2.5  3.7  8.0  12.2  12.1  12.2  13.0
6  Syria  /a,b,o  14.8  14.8  14.8  11.0  21.056
6  Yemen  /b,o  26.0  16.2  20.0
7  Algeria  /a,o,p  44.4  22.6  21.7  27.0  23.1  23.8  24.6  22.9  24.8
7  Egypt  /a,b,c  47.4  42.8  42.8  33.5  42.2  28.3  28.1
7  Libya  /a,o  13.3  15.4  18.3  27.0
7  Morocco  /a,c  54.0  36.0  33.0  27.0  23.0  20.8  24.0  22.8  24.4  25.7
7  Tunisia  /a,c,p  23.8  26.4  27.8  27.2  24.5  24.0  26.0  27.1  27.4  27.7  27.5  33.2  30.0
8  Argentina  /a,b,c,d,g  28.0  35.0  23.3  27.0  27.0  25.0  20.5  12.2  11.8  10.9  10.5  11.2
8  Bolivia  /a,c  12.1  20.0  20.0  19.0  17.0  16.0  10.0  10.0  9.8  9.8  9.7  9.7
8  Brazil  /a,c  44.0  49.0  48.0  48.0  49.0  51.0  51.0  51.0  41.0  35.0  32.2  25.3  21.2  14.2  10.7  11.8
8  Chile  /a,c,d,g  35.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0
8  Colombia  /a,c,d,f,h  61.0  33.6  29.4  27.3  27.3  27.0  21.1  11.8  11.5  11.5  11.3  11.7
8  Costa  Rica  /d,e  21.1  21.1  16.4  15.0  11.7  11.2  11.2
8  Ecuador  /a,e  37.7  28.0  37.1  9.3  11.9  12.3  11.4
8  El Salvador  /b.e.h  23.0  21.1  16.0  13.1  10.1  9.2
8  Guatemala  /b,e  22.8  16.0  10.8  10.1
8  Guyana  /b,e  17.4  20.0  17.0
8  Haiti  /a  27.7  11.6  10.0
8  Jamaica  /b.h,k  17.0  17.3  19.3  50.0  20.3  19.3  19.3
8  Mexico  /a,c  27.0  24.0  23.0  25.2  22.6  11.3  11.3  13.1  11.1  13.1  13.4  13.5  13.1  12.6
8  Nicaragua  /b,e  22.1  8.0  17.4  10.7
8  Paraguay  /a,b  11.2  10.9  10.9  15.9  15.4  8.0  9.3  9.4
8  Peru  Ic  19.0  17.0  21.0  31.0  42.0  46.0  46.0  45.0  46.0  42.0  26.0  17.0  18.0  16.3  16.3
8  Trinidad  & Tobago  /b,e  17.3  17.0  18.6  18.7  18.7
8  Uruguay  /b,c,h  47.0  38.0  40.0  29.1  27.5  23.0  21.5  18.2  17.0  14.7  9.9  9.7
8  Venezuela  /a,b,d,l  28.0  28.0  32.9  32.9  30.6  19.0  16.0  16.4  15.7  11.8  13.4
9  Bahamas  /a  29.8  32.3  32.0
9  Cyprus  /a,m  17.1  12.1  11.7  10.3  10.4  10.1  13.2
9  Hong  Kong  /a,c  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
9  Kuwait  /a,o  3.5  3.9  4.2
9  Qatar  /b,o  1.8  4.2  5.0
9  Singapore  /a,b,c  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4
9  Taiwan  /n  31.0  31.0  30.8  26.5  22.8  19.4  12.6  9.7  9.7  11.2
9  United  Arab  Emirates  /b,o  1.2  4.5  4.0
Notes:  --  All  tariff  rates  are  based  on  unweighted  averages  for  all  goods  in  ad valorem  rates,  applied  rates,
or  MFN  rates  whichever  data  are  available  in  a  longer  period.
--  Most  tariff  levels  exclude  para-tariffs  or  surcharges,  except  Cyprus,  Israel,  Jordan,
Madagascar,  Peru,  Trinidad  & Tobago,  and  Tunisia,
Sources:  /a  UNCTAD,  Directory  of  Import  Regimes:  Part  I  --  Monitoring  Import  regimes,  1994.
/b  UNCTAD,  Handbook  of  Trade  Control  Measures  of Developing  Countries,  Supplement,  1987.
/c GATT/WTO,  Trade  Policy  Review--Country  Report,  Various  Issues,  1989-96.
/d  Dean,  Desai,  and  Riedel,  Trade  Policy  reform  in  Developing  Countries  Since  1985:  A Review
of  the  Evidence,  World  Bank  Discussion  Papers  #267,  1994.
/e  Pritchett  and  Sethi,  Tariff  Rates:  What  Do We  Know?  Why  Do  We  Care?,  World  Bank  mimeo,  1993.
/f  World  Bank,  World  Bank  Support  for  Trade  Policy  Reform,  OED  Report  No.  9527,  1991.
/g World  Bank,  Strengthening  Trade  Policy  Reform,  Vol.  II,  Report  No.  SecM89-1454/1,  1989.57
/h  Finger  & Reincke,  Country  Tables,  World  Bank  IECIT  draft,  1995.
/i  World  Bank,  Czechoslovakia--Integrating  into  the  Global  Economy:  A  Transition  Strategy,
UNDP-WBTEP,  Country  Report  #8,  1992.
/j  World  Bank,  Czechoslovakia:  Transition  to  a Market  Economy,  Report  No.  8847-CZ,  1990.
/k  World  Bank,  Jamaica:  A  Strategy  for  Growth  and  Poverty  Reduction,  CEM,  Report  No.
12702-JM,  1994.
/1 World  Bank,  Venezuela:  Structural  and  Macroeconomic  Reforms  --  The  New  Regime,
Report  No.  10404-VE,  1993.
/m IMF,  Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook  and  International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook,
Various  issues,  1990-94.
/n Chen  and  Nou,  "The  Political  Economy  of  Trade  Protection  in Taiwan",  Chapter  12,
Trade  and  Protectionism,  edited  by  Ito  and  Krueger,  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1993.
/o Jamal  Zarrouk,  *Intra-Arab  Trade:  Determinants  and  Prospects",  Chepter  7, Foreign  and
and  Intratrade  Policies  of  the  Arab  Countries,  edited  by  Said  El-Naggar,  IMF,  1992.58
Table  A.3:  Average  Tariff  Levels  and  Total  Import  Charges  by  Primary  Products  for  80  Developing  Countries
(unweighted  in  %)
All  Primary  Food  Agric  Raw Matl  Mineral  Ores  Mineral  Fuels  Non  Fer. Metals
80 LDCs  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total
1  Benin  **  35.0  46.8  36.7  48.4  33.4  45.3  35.9  47.8  19.1  30.4  39.8  51.8
1  Burkina  Faso  68.6  84.7  83.3  100.6  49.8  65.5  60.8  76.9  53.2  63.3  63.5  80.0
1  Burundi  50.5  51.5  75.1  76.1  35.4  36.4  23.3  24.3  16.2  17.2  25.9  26.9
1  Centr Afr Rep  **  28.9  33.9  26.1  32.4  34.0  36.1  27.3  30.0  23.7  26.2  35.6  45.6
1  Cote d'Ivoire  **  18.8  19.7  23.2  24.0  9.3  10.6  18.0  18.9  17.5  18.6  20.9  21.5
1  Ethiopia  26.8  28.5  39.8  41.4  16.5  18.2  13.6  15.3  5.3  7.0  18.8  20.5
1  Ghana  **  28.1  32.4  26.0  26.0  30.0  48.0  29.7  29.7  29.9  29.9  30.0  30.0
1  Guinea  *  9.2  9.2  9.0  9.0  10.0  10.0  9.5  9.5  10.0  10.0  7.9  7.9
1  Kenya  46.3  47.3  64.6  65.6  33.2  34.2  27.7  28.7  21.6  22.6  29.3  30.3
1  Madagascar  3.7  38.9  6.8  51.1  0.9  36.2  0.4  19.9  0.1  26.4  2.6  22.2
1  Malawi  10.6  10.6  17.8  17.8  3.9  3.9  0.3  0.3  2.9  2.9  9.6  9.6
1  Mozambique  **  16.3  26.3  19.3  29.3  16.2  26.2  9.5  19.5  13.2  23.2  11.9  21.9
1  Nigeria  29.0  36.0  35.6  42.6  25.0  32.0  16.9  23.9  16.1  23.1  30.3  37.3
1  Sierra  Leone  *  19.4  19.4  18.2  18.2  26.8  26.8  12.6  12.6  18.7  18.7  17.5  17.5
1  Somalia  **  29.8  30.6  46.0  47.5  27.2  27.4  3.0  3.0  9.7  9.7  10.4  10.4
1  Sudan  **  56.6  56.6  70.9  70.9  50.3  50.3  38.3  38.3  25.4  25.4  54.2  54.2
1  Tanzania  33.9  33.9  44.4  44.4  29.6  29.6  22.5  22.5  11.5  11.5  25.0  25.0
1  Uganda  **  25.2  25.2  35.9  35.9  20.5  20.5  12.0  12.0  14.8  14.8  10.6  10.6
1  Zaire  20.7  20.7  27.6  27.6  15.9  15.9  14.2  14.2  10.5  10.5  17.5  17.5
1  Zambia  *  31.9  31.9  44.7  44.7  25.1  25.1  17.5  17.5  21.7  21.7  16.1  16.1
1  Zimbabwe  5.6  25.7  10.4  30.8  1.4  21.4  0.2  20.2  5.1  25.1  1.2  21.2
2  Angola  **  10.6  19.6  14.1  23.1  8.2  17.2  9.4  18.4  7.0  16.0  2.0  11.0
2  Cameroon  **  28.9  34.7  26.1  31.2  34.0  39.0  27.3  30.1  23.7  31.0  35.6  48.3
2  Congo  **  28.9  29.5  26.1  26.9  34.0  34.1  27.3  27.3  23.7  26.4  35.6  35.6
2  Mauritius  16.6  51.7  27.7  65.8  5.8  38.7  1.5  33.9  25.7  54.9  4.8  38.8
2  Senegal  **  38.9  38.9  43.9  43.9  33.4  33.4  36.4  36.4  31.3  31.3  36.9  36.9
3  Bangladesh  73.3  75.3  83.2  85.2  74.2  76.2  45.2  47.2  55.1  57.1  74.3  76.3
3  China  31.7  31.7  44.8  44.8  26.0  26.0  15.6  15.6  15.8  15.8  15.8  15.8
3  India  44.9  83.8  45.1  85.4  42.6  80.5  49.9  88.9  26.1  50.1  55.6  100.2
3  Nepal  8.9  8.9  12.6  12.6  4.0  4.0  3.6  3.6  6.6  6.6  11.1  11.1
3  Pakistan  54.1  65.7  69.9  81.2  34.6  46.1  38.5  49.3  47.6  58.5  45.9  60.1
3  Sri Lanka  26.7  29.9  41.3  47.1  17.0  18.8  13.2  14.1  13.4  13.7  11.4  11.6
4  Indonesia  13.6  17.1  20.8  25.2  8.9  11.4  4.3  6.8  4.9  7.9  9.0  11.7
4  Korea  12.9  14.5  20.9  21.7  6.5  6.5  3.2  4.3  5.5  20.2  8.3  8.3
4  Malaysia  7.3  8.7  9.4  11.5  6.6  7.3  3.5  3.8  5.0  5.6  7.2  9.5
4  Papua  N Guinea  *  4.5  11.8  3.3  10.2  8.4  15.9  2.1  9.6  0.8  8.3  5.7  13.2
4  Philippines  **  26.9  31.9  35.8  40.8  22.7  27.7  12.6  17.6  16.0  21.0  21.4  26.4
4  Thailand  26.2  26.2  38.1  38.1  26.8  26.8  14.3  14.3  24.1  24.1  19.7  19.7
5  Romania  **  13.8  13.8  23.4  23.4  8.3  8.3  4.3  4.3  3.8  3.8  1.5  1.5
5  Turkey  8.2  25.2  11.8  38.5  4.4  17.5  4.1  15.5  4.6  20.8  7.3  15.059
5  Yugoslavia  7.0  7.2  8.1  8.6  5.9  5.9  4.5  4.5  5.6  5.6  8.3  8.3
6  Bahrain  **  7.5  7.6  10.2  10.4  5.3  5.3  4.8  4.8  5.0  5.0  5.3  5.3
6  Iran  **  16.8  81.5  21.4  119.3  16.7  57.2  10.0  41.5  7.9  27.5  10.2  51.8
6  Jordan  *  7.2  19.6  11.2  25.2  2.9  13.2  3.8  14.1  4.8  16.1  5.9  19.9
6  Oman  **  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.2  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.4  1.4  2.0  2.0
6  Saudi  Arabia  12.0  12.0  11.9  11.9  12.0  12.0  12.1  12.1  12.3  12.3  11.8  11.8
6  Syria  **  13.1  25.1  20.4  34.8  7.7  17.7  5.9  15.5  8.8  19.7  6.2  16.2
6  Yemen  *  17.9  25.0  26.4  34.5  10.2  16.9  9.5  16.7  14.0  22.3  9.4  12.8
7  Algeria  18.6  20.8  29.1  31.9  9.8  12.7  8.3  9.6  3.2  4.7  13.6  14.6
7  Egypt  50.4  50.4  98.6  98.6  9.9  9.9  8.0  8.0  7.4  7.4  11.5  11.5
7  Libya  14.2  29.5  17.2  31.5  15.4  31.9  9.3  25.2  9.1  25.0  8.2  24.0
7  Morocco  **  18.2  30.9  27.7  40.2  9.5  22.8  8.4  20.9  10.3  22.8  11.9  24.4
7  Tunisia  25.7  28.7  32.6  36.2  19.7  22.1  19.5  22.2  13.5  15.5  23.9  26.6
8  Argentina  5.2  14.0  5.0  17.6  6.5  16.5  3.3  10.5  0.3  1.7  8.9  18.5
8  Bolivia  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.0
8  Brazil  7.2  9.4  11.1  13.3  5.9  8.1  0.2  2.4  1.1  3.3  5.4  7.6
8  Chile  11.0  20.5  11.0  20.9  11.0  19.9  11.0  19.7  11.0  19.0  11.0  21.8
8  Colombia  11.3  11.3  15.4  15.4  9.0  9.0  5.3  5.3  7.5  7.5  7.7  7.7
8  Costa  Rica  **  20.4  64.3  33.4  80.0  9.8  43.2  6.7  90.3  12.6  64.0  7.0  7.0
8  Ecuador  8.5  10.5  12.7  14.7  5.9  7.9  2.5  4.5  4.7  6.7  4.6  6.6
8  El  Salvador  *  19.9  19.9  32.9  32.9  9.8  9.8  6.6  6.6  9.5  9.5  7.0  7.0
8  Guatemala  **  20.9  20.9  33.3  33.3  9.8  9.8  6.6  6.6  9.2  9.2  7.0  7.0
8  Guyana  *  11.6  11.7  18.9  19.0  4.2  4.3  4.3  4.4  10.3  10.4  6.9  7.0
8  Haiti  **  14.5  19.8  21.6  26.4  8.5  15.3  7.2  12.8  4.9  5.1  11.4  17.7
8  Jamaica  **  11.6  11.8  18.9  19.2  4.2  4.6  4.3  4.3  10.3  10.3  6.9  6.9
8  Mexico  11.8  15.3  14.3  17.8  9.9  13.3  8.6  12.0  9.1  12.5  10.8  14.3
8  Nicaragua  *  20.3  22.7  33.4  35.9  9.8  12.3  6.6  9.1  10.6  12.9  6.8  9.3
8  Paraguay  14.7  14.7  20.3  20.3  16.8  16.8  4.1  4.1  2.1  2.1  6.9  6.9
8  Peru **  36.1  53.2  42.7  59.3  37.8  55.3  17.8  35.3  18.7  35.6  37.9  55.4
8  Trinidad  & Tob.  *  11.6  34.2  18.9  36.2  4.2  31.1  4.3  31.3  10.3  37.3  6.9  33.9
8  Uruguay  **  25.6  26.6  30.3  31.3  21.9  22.9  18.3  19.3  29.8  30.8  19.1  20.1
8  Venezuela  14.3  15.3  19.2  20.2  12.0  13.0  7.4  8.4  7.8  8.8  9.1  10.1
9  Bahamas  **  30.3  31.8  27.0  28.5  32.9  34.4  32.9  34.4  31.2  32.7  34.4  35.9
9  Cyprus  **  10.3  16.3  16.5  22.5  7.9  13.9  1.9  7.9  1.0  7.0  6.1  12.1
9  Hong  Kong  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
9  Kuwait  2.9  2.9  1.5  1.5  3.9  3.9  4.1  4.1  4.4  4.4  3.8  3.8
9  Qatar  **  4.9  4.9  5.9  5.9  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.9  3.9
9  Singapore  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.4  3.4  0.0  0.0
9  Taiwan,  China  6.1  6.1  7.5  7.5  3.0  3.0  0.5  0.5  2.5  2.5  2.8  2.8
*9  United  Arab  Em.  *  3.2  3.2  0.8  0.8  5.6  5.6  4.9  4.9  5.8  5.8  5.2  5.2
Sources:  UNCTAD,  Directory  of  Trade  Regimes,  1994  and  Handbook  of  Trade  Control  MEasures  of  Developing  Countries,  1987.60
Table  A.4s  Average  Tariff  Levels  and  Total  Zuport  Charges  by  Manufactured  Product  for  80 Developing  Countries
(Veweighted  in  9)
All Manuf.  Chemicals  Iron & Steel  Mach  & Equip.  Other  Manuf.  All  Products
80 LDCs  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total  Tariff  Total
1  Benin  *  38.3  50.3  35.8  47.7  40.0  52.0  21.2  32.6  47.8  60.1  37.4  49.4
1  Burkina  Faso **  57.9  73.8  61.8  77.6  58.8  75.1  48.4  63.7  60.8  77.1  60.8  76.8
1  Burundi  31.6  32.6  22.4  23.4  19.5  20.5  21.5  22.5  42.2  43.2  36.9  37.9
1  Centr Afr Rep *  33.0  41.2  29.1  32.3  29.0  32.6  25.1  34.2  39.2  49.6  32.0  39.3
1  Cote d'Ivoire  25.0  27.4  20.7  22.0  20.6  21.2  16.4  17.1  31.8  35.8  23.3  25.3
1  Ethiopia  30.6  32.2  15.5  17.0  5.7  7.1  14.3  15.9  47.2  48.9  29.6  31.2
1  Ghana  *  30.1  33.3  29.7  29.7  30.0  30.0  30.7  30.7  30.1  36.5  29.6  33.0
1  Guinea  *  8.8  8.8  9.4  9.4  10.0  10.0  7.0  7.0  9.2  9.2  8.9  8.9
1  Kenya  42.9  43.9  30.5  31.5  23.8  24.8  25.9  26.9  59.4  60.4  43.7  44.7
1  Madagascar  7.0  40.5  0.8  30.1  4.2  22.0  7.5  32.2  9.8  51.5  6.1  40.1
1  Malawi  16.9  16.9  9.7  9.7  9.3  9.3  15.0  15.0  22.1  22.1  15.2  15.2
1  Mozambique  **  15.3  25.3  10.3  20.3  19.6  29.6  9.6  19.6  21.8  31.8  15.6  25.6
1  Nigeria  34.2  41.2  22.2  29.2  19.8  26.8  20.1  27.1  48.3  55.3  32.8  39.8
1  Sierra  Leone  *  28.0  28.0  23.6  23.6  13.9  13.9  21.4  21.4  35.0  35.0  25.8  25.8
1  Somalia  *  31.0  31.1  18.7  18.7  9.3  9.3  20.5  20.5  44.4  44.4  30.8  31.0
1  Sudan  **  56.4  56.4  31.4  31.4  53.5  53.5  42.1  42.1  75.1  75.1  56.6  56.6
1  Tanzania  28.3  28.3  22.2  22.2  24.0  24.0  20.7  20.7  35.4  35.4  29.8  29.8
1  Uganda  **  17.9  17.9  12.3  12.3  14.0  14.0  10.7  10.7  24.6  24.6  19.9  19.9
1  Zaire  20.7  20.7  11.6  11.6  13.2  13.2  14.2  14.2  29.1  29.1  20.7  20.7
1  Zambia  **  29.1  29.1  20.3  20.3  16.2  16.2  19.6  19.6  39.3  39.3  29.9  29.9
1  Zimbabwe  11.8  31.8  3.7  23.7  6.1  26.1  7.6  27.6  18.2  38.2  10.1  30.1
2  Angola  **  11.9  20.8  9.2  17.9  8.3  17.3  6.6  15.6  19.7  28.7  11.6  20.6
2  Cameroon  33.1  44.9  29.1  35.1  29.0  41.8  25.5  39.4  39.2  52.4  32.0  42.2
2  Congo  **  33.0  34.4  29.1  30.1  29.0  29.3  25.1  26.3  39.2  41.1  32.0  33.2
2  Mauritius  31.6  63.4  13.6  44.7  10.4  44.4  31.5  65.0  42.2  73.1  27.6  60.3
2  Senegal  **  32.3  32.3  11.0  11.0  36.9  36.9  28.5  28.5  43.1  43.2  34.2  34.2
3  Bangladesh  84.5  86.5  71.7  73.7  82.2  84.2  75.2  77.2  95.2  97.2  81.2  83.2
3  China  39.7  39.7  25.2  25.2  13.7  13.7  30.0  30.0  54.1  54.1  37.5  37.5
3  India  56.1  99.4  60.5  104.8  56.9  101.2  43.9  87.6  60.2  102.8  53.0  95.2
3  Nepal  18.5  18.5  9.6  9.6  12.4  12.4  17.6  17.6  23.7  23.7  16.1  16.1
3  Pakistan  63.6  76.1  53.8  65.8  66.3  78.4  44.1  58.8  77.4  89.1  61.1  73.3
3  Sri Lanka  26.0  29.1  13.2  14.1  11.7  12.0  15.6  16.6  38.7  44.0  26.1  29.2
4  Indonesia  18.3  21.4  10.3  13.2  7.5  11.9  14.5  17.9  25.2  27.9  17.0  20.1
4  Korea  10.5  11.5  10.4  10.4  9.0  9.0  10.2  12.1  10.9  12.0  11.1  12.3
4  Malaysia  14.7  20.8  9.3  11.5  7.3  7.9  10.0  16.0  20.2  28.5  12.8  17.6
4  Papua  N Guinea  *  7.7  14.8  4.6  11.9  0.2  7.7  4.6  11.9  11.6  18.5  7.0  14.2
4  Philippines  **  28.5  33.5  18.4  23.4  14.3  19.3  23.7  28.7  37.1  42.1  28.1  33.1
4  Thailand  41.8  41.8  29.9  29.9  19.6  19.6  35.3  35.3  52.5  52.5  37.8  37.8
5  Romania  18.0  18.0  9.8  9.8  3.6  3.6  16.9  16.9  23.8  23.8  16.7  16.7
5  Turkey  9.3  24.6  8.2  24.1  6.9  12.7  8.0  17.8  10.8  29.9  9.0  24.7
5  Yugoslavia  13.7  13.8  9.5  9.6  12.7  12.7  13.7  13.7  15.6  15.9  11.8  12.061
6  Bahrain  **  7.0  7.0  4.8  4.8  5.0  5.0  8.4  8.4  7.5  7.5  7i1  7.1
6  Iran **  22.2  108.2  15.4  44.4  11.9  37.8  12.3  54.7  31.3  171.2  20.7  100.9
6  Jordan  **  16.2  31.1  8.0  21.5  6.4  21.7  13.6  26.4  22.3  38.8  13.8  28.0
6  Oman  **  3.3  3.3  7.8  7.8  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.9  2.9
6  Saudi Arabia  12.2  12.2  11.9  11.9  13.2  13.2  11.8  11.8  12.4  12.4  12.1  12.1
6  Syria  *  15.5  28.5  7.3  17.6  3.8  12.6  11.5  23.1  22.7  38.1  14.8  27.5
6  Yemen  **  15.6  20.9  10.0  18.2  12.1  15.3  12.0  15.4  20.4  25.5  16.2  22.0
7  Algeria  24.6  26.6  14.2  15.3  12.3  13.3  16.3  18.6  34.9  37.1  22.9  24.9
7  Egypt  27.1  27.1  10.2  10.2  9.8  9.8  18.1  18.1  40.2  40.2  33.5  33.5
7  Libya  **  19.7  36.5  6.8  22.3  1.7  16.8  19.4  36.1  27.7  45.4  18.3  34.7
7  Morocco  **  25.6  38.2  18.7  31.2  8.3  20.8  20.8  33.3  33.2  45.9  23.5  36.1
7  Tunisia  28.2  31.3  23.1  25.6  18.5  20.8  24.2  26.9  33.7  37.4  27.5  30.6
8  Argentina  12.7  21.5  7.7  15.6  10.1  20.2  14.5  20.0  14.4  25.0  10.6  19.4
8  Bolivia  16.5  16.5  17.0  17.0  16.8  16.8  15.2  15.2  17.0  17.0  16.7  16.7
8  Brazil  15.6  17.8  10.8  13.0  11.0  13.2  19.4  21.6  16.3  18.5  13.2  15.4
8  Chile  10.9  19.7  11.0  19.2  11.0  19.0  10.7  19.2  11.0  20.3  10.9  19.9
8  Colombia  12.0  12.0  8.7  8.7  8.3  8.3  9.6  9.6  15.2  15.2  11.8  11.8
8  Costa Rica  **  21.5  60.9  10.7  12.1  7.4  15.4  10.8  14.0  33.2  111.2  21.1  61.7
8  Ecuador  9.5  11.5  6.1  8.1  4.7  6.7  6.4  8.4  13.3  15.3  9.3  11.2
8  El Salvador  *  21.5  21.5  10.6  10.6  7.4  7.4  10.3  10.3  33.6  33.6  21.1  21.1
8  Guatemala  **  23.5  23.5  10.6  10.6  7.4  7.4  11.0  11.0  37.4  37.4  22.8  22.8
8  Guyana  *  19.4  19.5  7.5  7.6  9.2  9.3  15.5  15.6  27.8  27.9  17.4  17.5
8  Haiti  **  10.5  15.6  7.9  10.4  5.9  11.9  6.7  12.1  14.0  20.2  11.6  16.8
8  Jamaica  **  19.3  19.4  7.5  7.5  9.2  9.2  15.1  15.5  27.8  27.9  17.3  17.5
8  Mexico  13.9  17.5  11.2  14.6  10.2  13.6  13.6  17.1  15.8  19.4  13.4  16.9
8  Nicaragua  22.9  25.3  10.6  13.1  7.3  9.8  10.8  13.3  36.1  38.6  22.1  24.6
8  Paraguay  15.5  15.5  5.8  5.8  8.6  8.6  11.9  11.9  22.4  22.4  15.4  15.4
8  Peru **  54.0  71.5  38.5  55.6  29.7  46.3  42.9  60.4  69.3  87.1  48.9  66.3
8  Trinidad  & To *  19.3  46.2  7.5  34.2  9.2  36.2  15.1  42.1  27.8  54.8  17.3  43.1
8  Uruguay **  28.2  29.2  20.7  21.7  20.1  21.1  23.0  24.0  35.2  36.2  27.5  28.5
8  Venezuela  17.2  18.2  10.5  11.5  7.9  8.9  12.3  13.4  23.7  24.7  16.4  17.4
9  Bahamas  **  33.1  34.6  31.9  33.4  35.0  36.5  35.3  36.8  32.3  33.8  32.3  33.8
9  Cyprus  *  20.3  26.3  8.6  14.6  3.1  9.1  11.7  17.7  30.9  36.9  17.5  23.5
9  Hong  Kong  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
9  Kuwait  4.7  4.7  5.2  5.2  4.1  4.1  4.1  4.1  4.8  4.8  4.2  4.2
9  Qatar  *  4.0  4.0  4.1  4.1  4.0  4.0  4.1  4.1  3.9  3.9  4.2  4.2
9  Singapore  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.4  0.4
9  Taiwan,  China  10.7  10.7  5.2  5.2  7.3  7.3  8.8  8.8  5.0  5.0  9.7  9.7
9  United  Arab  Em.  **  4.9  4.9  4.4  4.4  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.5  5.5  4.5  4.5
Sources:  UNCTAD,  Directory  of  Trade  Regimes,  1994  and  Handbook  of Trade  Control Measures  of Developing  Countries,  1987.62
Table  A.5s  8ewtoral  Axerage-  of Non-Tariff  Mueaures  Coverage  Ratio  /a  in S0 Developing Countries
(Unmeighted in %)
All  Agr  Raw  Min.  Min. Non  Per  All  Chem-  Iron  &  Mach  &  Other  All
80  LDCs /b  Primary  Food  Matl.  Ores  Fuels  Metals  Manuf  icals  Steel  Bquip.  Manuf  Goods
1  Benin  **  24.3  41.4  12.3  0.0  30.6  0.0  14.2  6.2  0.0  26.4  13.2  17.0
1  Burkina  Paso  48.6  32.5  69.5  23.9  97.2  73.6  93.2  94.7  100.0  96.6  90.1  80.6
1  Burundi  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.6  0.3
1  Centr  Afr Rep  **  9.3  12.7  1.3  0.7  41.7  0.0  3.1  2.8  0.9  0.6  4.8  5.1
1  Cote  d'Ivoire  **  12.5  21.1  1.0  4.5  25.0  0.0  4.4  6.7  0.8  6.1  3.0  6.6
1  Ethiopia  42.9  69.7  35.2  11.2  1.4  7.5  14.7  0.9  1.8  7.2  26.1  22.5
1  Ghana  *-  63.9  76.8  64.5  69.4  19.4  28.3  42.0  14.6  52.7  19.2  64.4  48.4
1  Guinea  4t  46.9  76.5  38.6  2.2  1.4  19.3  35.1  6.7  25.3  37.8  47.5  38.2
1  Kenya  37.0  68.3  14.7  7.5  2.8  5.2  38.3  5.4  24.4  16.1  65.8  37.8
1  Madagascar  0.8  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.0  5.9  1.6  1.4  0.0  0.9  2.1  1.7
1  Malawi  84.8  76.1  99.6  84.3  74.3  100.0  93.8  86.3  87.3  100.0  94.7  91.3
1  Mozambique  *  42.2  25.9  48.2  35.1  58.3  100.0  62.7  69.1  100.0  43.7  65.1  56.9
1  Nigeria  22.7  38.9  17.5  1.5  0.0  0.0  3.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  6.2  8.8
1  Sierra  Leone  *-  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1  Somalia  *-  13.6  6.7  0.0  47.8  38.9  13.2  2.8  5.0  0.0  1.4  2.9  6.3
1  Sudan  *-  12.0  25.1  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.9  9.4  3.3  0.0  3.8  15.9  10.0
1  Tanzania  64.3  65.7  62.3  57.5  63.6  71.7  85.9  96.7  97.3  77.5  83.9  79.7
1  Uganda *'  13.8  26.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  15.1  14.1  0.0  3.3  38.2  9.4  13.9
1  Zaire  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1  Zambia  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Zimbabwe  99.7  100.0  99.9  100.0  98.8  98.1  91.2  94.5  100.0  97.5  85.5  93.6
2  Angola  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  1.4  0.0  0.5  1.1  0.7
2  Cameroon  ii  13.2  8.1  37.7  5.5  0.0  1.9  23.4  10.1  4.4  8.1  39.3  20.7
2  Congo  **  2.8  5.0  0.9  2.2  0.0  0.0  4.9  4.2  1.8  2.4  6.8  4.6
2  Mauritius  30.8  42.0  12.3  16.4  12.9  50.0  36.9  17.8  53.5  46.1  38.8  35.2
2  Senegal  *-  8.4  13.1  2.3  3.0  16.7  1.9  6.1  8.2  10.7  3.1  6.2  7.2
3  Bangladesh  *-  55.2  73.9  52.3  20.3  66.7  13.6  46.8  30.7  39.3  30.7  63.0  49.4
3  China  11.5  3.4  38.4  3.2  12.3  0.2  11.3  3.1  74.6  9.9  8.1  11.3
3  India  71.7  88.4  47.6  68.3  85.3  43.7  58.9  53.3  50.6  36.3  73.8  62.6
3  Nepal  1.0  0.0  0.0  2.2  0.0  6.6  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.7
3  Pakistan  6.8  8.6  3.3  3.0  22.1  0.0  17.3  13.6  0.0  4.1  27.6  14.5
3  Sri  Lanka  2.8  4.5  0.0  4.0  0.0  1.9  4.0  10.6  0.0  5.8  0.6  3.8
4  Indonesia  4.6  8.7  0.0  1.0  4.2  0.8  2.0  1.4  16.1  2.3  0.4  2.7
4  Korea  9.0  17.6  1.8  0.7  2.8  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  2.6
4  Malaysia  1.2  2.0  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.0  2.4  3.6  8.5  2.2  1.2  2.1
4  Papua  N Guinea  *-  9.4  20.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.6
4  Philippines  ii  40.5  60.0  24.2  12.7  75.0  0.0  46.3  47.7  20.1  87.6  28.0  44.9
4  Thailand  8.8  12.7  3.8  7.8  8.3  3.6  4.2  0.9  0.6  3.6  6.3  5.5
5  Romania **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
5  Turkey  93.9  92.2  99.3  98.5  70.6  100.0  97.3  92.3  100.0  99.1  98.3  96.4
5  Yugoslavia  36.6  39.8  39.4  21.8  25.3  42.9  25.9  10.9  81.9  21.5  28.2  29.2
6  Bahrain ii  2.0  3.9  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  2.0  0.0  3.5  0.0  1.5
6  Iran *t  99.0  97.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  99.4  97.2  100.0  100.0  100.0  99.3
6  Jordan ii  37.0  77.3  0.9  4.5  0.0  0.0  3.6  9.8  0.0  2.2  2.1  12.9
6  Oman *-  2.2  2.9  0.9  4.5  0.0  0.0  3.8  7.8  0.0  3.3  2.8  3.6
6  Saudi  Arabia  4.4  8.9  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.4  5.6  4.0  5.0  1.4  3.9
6  Syria  ii  30.7  44.4  31.1  14.9  11.8  1.1  38.7  32.1  25.3  28.9  48.3  36.6
6  Yemen **  25.2  19.8  38.9  2.6  97.2  0.0  30.2  0.9  0.0  45.2  39.4  28.7
7  Algeria  26.8  57.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  1.2  0.0  0.2  5.2  9.5
7  Egypt  43.8  70.1  10.5  10.4  78.6  16.4  45.6  55.9  17.3  29.5  52.5  45.2
7  Libya  ii  15.0  29.2  4.8  2.2  0.0  0.0  8.4  1.6  1.3  6.7  13.2  10.3
7  Morocco  **  43.0  73.9  13.6  4.5  65.0  0.9  21.8  13.0  3.1  11.8  33.0  27.6
7  Tunisia  37.3  62.3  9.4  17.1  26.7  17.4  30.5  14.5  8.5  18.8  46.1  32.7
8  Argentina  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.2
8  Bolivia  1.6  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  2.9  0.0  3.4  0.7  2.0
8  Brazil  4.1  0.5  0.5  1.6  47.3  1.9  0.4  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5
8  Chile  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
8  Colombia  1.0  1.2  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  5.5  0.0  0.3  0.7  1.7
8  Costa  Rica  ii  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  4.1  0.0  0.8
8  Ecuador  67.5  91.4  54.1  19.2  84.6  38.7  61.8  42.1  27.1  39.9  85.7  63.6
8  El  Salvador  '*  17.7  33.9  0.9  3.0  0.0  11.3  19.7  0.7  0.8  10.3  35.1  19.2
8  Guatemala  ii  12.5  20.6  9.2  6.0  0.0  0.0  5.0  13.3  0.0  4.2  2.2  7.4
8  Guyana  **  18.0  37.6  0.0  3.0  0.0  0.0  15.3  53.2  18.7  1.8  4.9  16.0
8  Haiti  **  34.5  51.3  39.5  0.7  16.7  2.8  29.7  8.9  6.7  24.7  44.1  30.8
8  Jamaica  *-  10.3  20.3  1.9  3.0  0.0  0.0  4.8  13.4  0.0  5.6  1.1  6.663
8  Mexico  8.5  12.9  6.1  0.0  15.6  0.0  1.8  1.1  13.1  1.4  1.0  3.9
8  Nicaragua  **  25.6  52.2  3.5  0.7  1.4  1.9  28.5  7.0  2.0  16.1  47.5  27.8
8  Paraguay  6.4  12.5  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.8
8  Peru  **  73.0  99.9  67.4  20.9  38.9  52.8  45.8  24.9  100.0  14.4  64.6  53.4
8  Trinidad  &  Tob.  *  30  8  61.6  0.0  2.1  20.8  2.2  20.5  5.9  10.0  13.4  31.9  23.4
8  Uruguay  **  10.0  3.8  3.9  5.0  94.4  0.2  15.5  16.7  2.2  3.5  22.7  14.1
8  Venezuela  3.0  3.6  1.0  1.5  9.7  1.9  1.7  6.1  0.0  0.3  0.7  2.4
9  Bahamas  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1
9  Cyprus  **  40.8  68.4  15.8  9.0  48.1  5.7  28.6  30.3  23.3  47.0  19.3  32.2
9  Hong  Kong  0.8  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.4  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.5
9  Kuwait  6.8  10.2  0.0  5.2  0.0  13.2  1.8  2.2  1.3  1.1  2.1  3.5
9  Qatar  **  2.4  5.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.3
9  Singapore  1.2  1.7  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3
9  Taiwan, China  S80  94.2  38.9  18.7  100.0  18.5  28.8  35.8  22.4  27.2  30.2  35.9
9  United Arab Bm. *  2.9  5.3  0.0  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0
Notes; /a  Include  additional  quantitative  restrictions  in  the  form  of  all  types  of  licences  and  import  authorizati
quotas, import prohibitions, advance import deposits, foreign exchange restrictions, fixed customs valua
and state trading monopolies. It is calculated as %  of products within a category that is affected by a
applied  to a tariff line.
/b Countries  with  ** are the late 1980s data, where country classifications are as: 1 * Low  income  Africa,
2 - Middle income Africa, 3 - Low  income  Asia,  4  - Middle income  Asia, S - Other Europe,
6 - Middle East, 7 - North  Africa,  8  - Latin  America,  9  - High income Non-OBCDs.
Sources: UNCTAD, Directory of Trade Regimes, 1994 and Handbook of Trade Control Measures of  Developing  Countries,
1987.64
Tablo  A.£6 Sectoral  Averages  of  Quantitative  Restriction  Coverage  Ratio  /a  in  s0  Developing  Countries
(Uhweight.d  In  %)
All  Agr Raw  Min.  Min. Non  Per  All  Chem-  Iron  &  Mach  &  Other  All
80  LDCs /b  Primary  Food  Matl.  Ores  Fuels  Metals  Manuf  icals  Steel  Equip.  Manuf.  Goods
1  Benin  **  15.1  21.9  11.8  0.0  30.6  0.0  6.4  4.8  0.0  0.0  12.1  9.1
1  Burkina  Paso  '*  46.8  28.7  69.3  23.9  97.2  73.6  93.2  94.7  100.0  96.6  90.1  80.1
1  Burundi  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.6  0.3
1  Centr  Afr Rep  *'  6.4  13.0  0.8  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.8  2.5  0.9  0.6  2.1  3.4
1  Cote  dlIvoire  **  11.5  19.4  0.1  4.5  25.0  0.0  4.3  6.6  0.7  6.1  2.7  6.2
1  Ethiopia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
1  Ghana  **  61.3  74.6  60.5  63.4  19.4  28.3  38.1  8.2  49.3  18.0  60.3  44.9
1  Guinea  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Kenya  34.5  62.8  14.7  7.5  2.8  5.2  38.3  5.4  24.4  16.1  65.8  37.1
1  Madagascar  0.8  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.0  5.9  1.6  1.4  0.0  0.9  2.1  1.7
1  Malawi  84.8  76.1  99.6  84.3  74.3  100.0  93.8  86.3  87.3  100.0  94.7  91.3
1  Mozambique  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Nigeria  22.7  38.9  17.5  1.5  0.0  0.0  3.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  6.2  8.8
1  Sierra Leone **  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  i00.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1  Somalia **  13.6  6.7  0.0  47.8  38.9  13.2  2.9  5.3  0.0  1.4  2.9  6.3
1  Sudan  **  12.0  25.1  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.9  9.4  3.3  0.0  3.8  15.9  10.0
1  Tanzania  19.7  12.3  36.4  18.7  1.4  30.2  30.7  32.3  13.4  10.3  42.4  27.5
1  Uganda  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Zaire  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1  Zambia  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Zimbabwe  99.7  100.0  99.9  100.0  98.8  98.1  91.2  94.5  100.0  97.5  85.5  93.6
2  Angola  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  1.4  0.0  0.5  1.1  0.7
2  Cameroon  *  13.7  9.1  37.7  5.5  0.0  1.9  21.8  10.3  4.4  7.8  36.0  19.5
2  Congo **  1.7  3.3  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  3.1  4.0  1.8  2.2  3.4  3.1
2  Mauritius  30.8  42.0  12.3  16.4  12.9  50.0  36.9  17.8  53.5  46.1  38.8  35.2
2  Senegal  **  5.7  10.1  0.0  3.0  4.6  1.9  5.1  8.3  10.7  3.0  4.0  5.7
3  Bangladesh  *t  53.3  73.6  51.5  20.3  44.0  13.6  46.8  30.7  39.3  30.7  62.5  48.6
3  China  11.5  3.4  38.4  3.2  12.3  0.2  11.3  3.1  74.6  9.9  8.1  11.3
3  India  65.0  82.3  44.5  59.0  66.8  38.3  56.2  51.2  14.0  36.3  73.5  58.8
3  Nepal  1.0  0.0  0.0  2.2  0.0  6.6  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.7
3  Pakistan  6.8  8.6  3.3  3.0  22.1  0.0  17.3  13.6  0.0  4.1  27.6  14.5
3  Sri  Lanka  2.8  4.5  0.0  4.0  0.0  1.9  4.0  10.6  0.0  5.8  0.6  3.8
4  Indonesia  2.2  4.2  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.8  1.8  1.2  14.3  2.3  0.4  1.9
4  Korea  9.0  17.6  1.8  0.7  2.8  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  2.6
4  Malaysia  1.2  2.0  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.0  2.4  3.6  8.5  2.2  1.2  2.1
4  Papua  N  Guinea  **  9.4  19.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.6
4  Philippines tt  38.2  56.5  21.1  12.7  75.0  0.0  43.7  49.0  20.1  87.5  22.3  42.4
4  Thailand  8.8  12.7  3.8  7.8  8.3  3.6  4.2  0.9  0.6  3.6  6.3  5.5
S  Romania  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
s  Turkey  2.0  0.0  0.9  9.7  0.0  4.7  3.0  1.8  16.0  5.9  0.5  2.7
s  Yugoslavia  36.6  39.8  39.4  21.8  25.3  42.9  25.9  10.9  81.9  21.5  28.2  29.2
6  Bahrain  *-  2.0  3.9  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  2.0  0.0  3.4  0.0  1.5
6  Iran  **  98.8  97.9  99.9  100.0  97.2  100.0  94.5  75.6  100.0  100.0  99.5  95.4
6  Jordan **  39.2  82.0  0.9  4.5  0.0  0.0  3.6  9.8  0.0  2.3  2.1  11.7
6  Oman  *-  2.2  2.9  0.9  4.5  0.0  0.0  3.8  7.8  0.0  3.3  2.7  3.6
6  Saudi Arabia  4.4  8.9  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.1  5.6  0.0  5.0  1.4  3.5
6  Syria  **  25.2  40.8  16.1  11.9  11.8  0.5  31.7  20.5  0.0  28.9  41.8  30.0
6  Yemen  **  18.2  19.8  38.9  1.1  0.0  0.0  30.3  0.9  0.0  45.4  39.4  26.8
7  Algeria  26.8  57.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  1.2  0.0  0.2  5.2  9.5
7  Egypt  31.0  53.8  9.6  7.5  12.9  16.4  43.7  48.9  17.3  29.5  51.7  40.3
7  Libya  **  15.0  29.2  4.8  2.2  0.0  0.0  8.4  1.6  1.3  6.7  13.2  10.3
7  Morocco  **  40.2  69.2  13.6  0.0  65.0  0.9  20.9  8.7  3.1  11.8  33.0  26.2
7  Tunisia  32.7  52.5  9.4  17.1  26.7  17.4  29.7  11.1  8.5  18.8  46.1  31.0
8  Argentina  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.2
8  Bolivia  1.6  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  2.9  0.0  3.4  0.7  2.0
8  Brazil  4.1  0.5  0.5  1.6  47.3  1.9  0.4  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5
8  Chile  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
8  Colombia  1.0  1.2  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  5.5  0.0  0.3  0.7  1.7
8  Costa  Rica  *-  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  4.1  0.0  0.8
8  Ecuador  30.2  43.0  31.2  7.3  19.6  6.6  25.7  19.8  14.2  11.1  36.9  27.0
8  E1 Salvador  **  17.7  33.9  0.9  3.0  0.0  11.3  19.7  0.7  0.8  10.3  35.1  19.2
8  Guatemala  **  12.5  20.6  9.2  6.0  0.0  0.0  4.2  13.3  0.0  3.3  1.2  6.6
8  Guyana  **  13.0  27.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4  0.4  0.0  0.2  2.7  4.6
8  Haiti  **  19.9  38.3  1.8  0.7  16.7  2.8  11.1  7.3  6.7  0.5  18.8  13.5
8  Jamaica  **  10.3  22.5  1.9  3.0  0.0  0.0  4.6  10.3  0.0  3.3  1.2  6.065
8  Mexico  6.1  10.4  1.1  0.0  14.7  0.0  0.7  0.3  0.0  1.4  0.5  2.4
8  Nicaragua  **  25.6  52.2  3.5  0.7  1.4  1.9  28.5  7.0  2.0  16.1  47.5  27.8
8  Paraguay  6.4  12.5  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.8
8  Peru  **  72.9  99.9  67.4  20.9  38.9  52.8  45.8  24.9  100.0  14.4  64.4  53.1
8  Trinidad  & Tob.  **  29.4  58.5  0.0  2.1  20.8  2.2  16.5  5.1  10.0  6.3  27.6  20.1
8  Uruguay  **  1.0  0.8  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.1  0.0  2.5  0.3  1.1
8  Venezuela  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.5  0.0  1.9  1.4  4.6  0.0  0.3  0.7  1.6
9  Bahamas  **  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1
9  Cyprus  **  40.8  68.4  15.8  9.0  48.1  5.7  28.6  30.3  23.3  47.0  19.3  32.2
9  Hong  Kong  0.8  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.4  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.5
9  Xuwait  6.4  9.3  0.0  5.2  0.0  13.2  1.8  2.2  1.3  1.1  1.9  3.3
9  Qatar  **  2.4  5.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.2
9  Singapore  1.2  1.7  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3
9  Taiwan,  China  58.0  94.2  38.9  18.7  100.0  18.5  28.8  35.8  22.4  27.2  30.2  35.9
9  United  Arab  Em.  *  2.9  5.3  0.0  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0
Notes:  /a Include  quantitative  restrictions  in the  form  of all  types  of  licences  and  import  authorization,  quotas,
and  import  prohibitions.  It  is calculated  as  t  of products  within  a category  that  is  affected  by  a QR
applied  to a  tariff  line.
lb  Countries  with  ** are  the  late  1980s  data,  where  country  classifications  are  as:  1 - Low  income  Africa,
2 - Middle  income  Africa,  3  - Low  income  Asia,  4  - Middle  income  Asia,  5 - Other  Europe,
6 - Middle  East,  7  - North  Africa,  8 - Latin  America,  9 - High  income  Non-OECDs.
Sources:  UNCTAD,  Directory  of  Trade  Regimes,  1994  and  Handbook  of Trade  Control  Measures  of  Developing  Countries,
1987.66
Table A.7: Pre- and Post Uruguay Round IDport Coverage Ratio of Non-Tariff
Measures in OECD Karket
1992 OECD  Pre-UR  Post-UR
Imports  Coverage  Coverage  Percent  Level
80 LDCs  ($  mill)  Ratio  (I)  Ratio  (e)  Change  Change
1  Benin  76  1.3  0.3  -76.9  -1.0
1  Burkina Faso  53  12.3  0.0  -100.0  -12.3
1  Burundi  74  0.1  0.0  -100.0  -0.1
1  Central African Rep  102  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
1  Cote d'Ivoire  2258  14.1  1.5  -89.4  -12.6
1  Ethiopia  160  1.8  1.2  -33.3  -0.6
1  Ghana  886  0.4  0.2  -50.0  -0.2
1  Guinea  526  0.3  0.1  -66.7  -0.2
1  Kenya  837  3.5  0.3  -91.4  -3.2
1  Madagascar  340  7.6  2.9  -61.8  -4.7
1  Malawi  393  29.6  3.7  -87.5  -25.9
1  Mozambique  147  10.3  0.6  -94.2  -9.7
1  Nigeria  11379  14.4  14.4  0.0  0.0
1  Sierra Leone  354  0.1  0.0  -100.0  -0.1
1  Somalia  19  9.0  0.0  -100.0  -9.0
1  Sudan  149  12.4  4.1  -66.9  -8.3
1  Tanzania  266  3.8  0.5  -86.8  -3.3
1  Uganda  162  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Zaire  1277  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
1  Zambia  630  0.7  0.0  -100.0  -0.7
1  Zimbabwe  875  20.3  6.9  -66.0  -13.4
2  Angola  3684  4.7  4.7  0.0  0.0
2  Cameroon  1577  20.8  19.7  -5.3  -1.1
2  Congo  1440  38.5  38.0  -1.3  -0.5
2  Mauritius  1279  61.6  2.2  -96.4  -59.4
2  Senegal  362  19.1  0.0  -100.0  -19.1
3  Bangladesh  2060  58.3  10.5  -82.0  -47.8
3  China  70347  18.2  3.3  -81.9  -14.9
3  India  13532  29.4  5.1  -82.7  -24.3
3  Nepal
3  Pakistan  3979  50.4  6.9  -86.3  -43.5
3  Sri Lanka  2067  50.5  0.9  -98.2  -49.6
4  Indonesia  22741  10.1  2.6  -74.3  -7.5
4  Korea  42981  24.0  10.9  -54.6  -13.1
4  Malaysia  23862  6.5  0.7  -89.2  -5.8
4  Papua N Guinea
4  Philippines  9496  20.4  1.2  -94.1  -19.2
4  Thailand  22544  25.3  2.2  -91.3  -23.1
5  Czechoslovakia  4420  19.2  2.5  -87.0  -16.7
5  Hungary  4302  24.8  6.7  -73.0  -18.1
5  Poland  5870  17.1  6.0  -64.9  -11.1
5  Romania  1388  27.1  10.9  -59.8  -16.2
5  Turkey  6286  36.8  3.9  -89.4  -32.9
5  Yogoslavia  9611  19.7  5.5  -72.1  -14.2
6  Bahrain
6  Iran  9822  10.1  9.9  -2.0  -0.2
6  Jordan  148  2.3  1.1  -52.2  -1.2
6  Oman
6  Saudi Arabia
6  Syria  1328  20.3  20.2  -0.5  -0.1
6  Yemen  817  2.1  2.1  0.0  0.0
7  Algeria  9428  25.5  25.4  -0.4  -0.1
7  Egypt  3853  23.2  9.3  -59.9  -13.9
7  Libya67
7  Morocco  4778  30.2  3.0  -90.1  -27.2
7  Tunisia  3377  25.7  4.6  -82.1  -21.1
8  Argentina  6606  15.5  1.2  -92.3  -14.3
8  Bolivia  271  0.7  0.3  -57.1  -0.4
8  Brazil  24369  10.6  2.1  -80.2  -8.5
8  Chile  7017  6.5  0.2  -96.9  -6.3
8  Colombia  5724  6.6  2.5  -62.1  -4.1
8  Costa Rica  2349  15.7  0.9  -94.3  -14.8
8  Ecuador  2537  5.7  1.5  -73.7  -4.2
8  El Salvador  535  4.5  1.3  -71.1  -3.2
8  Guatemala  1525  12.5  1.6  -87.2  -10.9
8  Guyana  325  41.6  3.9  -90.6  -37.7
8  Haiti  145  13.0  0.0  -100.0  -13.0
8  Jamaica  1287  35.2  2.7  -92.3  -32.5
8  Mexico  43301  7.9  4.8  -39.2  -3:.1
8  Nicaragua  229  10.1  1.3  -87.1  -8.8
8  Paraguay  306  0.9  0.3  -66.7  -0.6
8  Peru  2161  5.7  0.0  -100.0  -5.7
8  Trinidad & Tobago  1219  7.6  1.3  -82.9  -6.3
8  Uruguay  790  33.7  0.7  -97.9  -33.0
8  Venezuela  11318  9.2  8.3  -9.8  -0.9
9  Bahamas  1038  1.9  1.9  0.0  0.0
9  Cyprus  480  18.7  2.9  -84.5  -15.8
9  Hong Kong  26368  34.3  1.8  -94.8  -32.5
9  Kuwait
9  Qatar
9  Singapore  22686  7.1  1.3  -81.7  -5.8
9  Taiwan, China  55335  12.0  3.1  -74.2  -8.9
9  United Arab Em.
Notes:  /a Non-tariff measures include tariff quotas, increased duties, safeguard duties,
retaliatory duties and customs surcharges, variable levies and flexible import fees,
non-automatic licensing and discretionary licensing, quotas and prohibitions, voluntary
export restraints, MFA quotas and textile restraint arrangemnts, orderly marketing
arrangements, other quantitative restrictions, other restrictions imposed under the MFA
minimum, reference or other import price controls, voluntary export price restraints,
state monopoly of imports, and local content regulations.
/b Calculations of non-tariff measures are based on all goods imported in OECD markets.
Sources: World Bank-UNCTAD, SMART data base; Low and Yeats, "Non-tariff Measures and Developing
Countries", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #1353, 1994; and Amjadi and Yeats,
"Non-tariff Barriers Africa Faces", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #1439, 1995.68
Table  A.8:  Average  Tariffs,  Non-Tariff  Measures  and  Uconatac  growth  for  80
Developing  Countrisa  (%)
Recent  Total  All  GDP  Export  Import  Open-
80 LDCs  /g  Tariffs /a  Charges  /b  NTMs /c  Growth /d  Growth /a  Growth  /e  ness  /f
I1Benin  41.6  49.4  17.0  2.7  4.8  -4.8  37.0
1  Burkina  Faso  **  60.8  76.8  80.6  3.7  4.1  3.4  17.2
1  Burundi  36.9  37.9  0.3  3.6  5.6  -0.4  21.6
1  Centr  Afr  Rep  **  32.0  39.3  5.1  1.0  -1.1  2.1  23.0
1  Cote  d'Ivoire  22.0  25.3  6.6  0.1  2.7  -4.2  49.0
1  Ethiopia  29.6  31.2  22.5  1.8  -2.2  -1.3  17.1
1  Ghana  17.0  33.0  48.4  3.5  5.3  2.7  34.6
1  Guinea  10.8  10.8  39.2  3.7  -4.5  -3.2  39.9
1  Kenya  22.0  44.7  37.8  3.8  3.3  -0.8  36.0
1  Madagascar  6.1  40.1  1.7  0.9  0.4  -3.3  24.6
1  Malawi  16.3  16.3  91.3  3.0  2.1  4.0  35.2
1  Mozambique  **  15.6  25.6  56.9  1.0  -6.9  0.0  50.7
1  Nigeria  32.8  39.8  8.8  2.7  -0.6  -11.2  39.9
1  Sierra  Leone  41.0  41.0  100.0  1.1  -0.1  -7.4  38.0
1  Somalia  23.2  31.0  6.3  2.4  -7.8  -4.5  46.8
1  Sudan  43.0  56.6  10.0  1.9  -3.8  -4.5  18.2
1  Tanzania  27.5  27.5  79.7  3.6  -0.4  -1.1  26.1
1  Uganda  17.1  17.1  13.9  3.8  -1.4  -2.3  18.7
1  Zaire  24.7  24.7  100.0  1.9  1.6  3.3  29.5
1  Zambia  13.6  13.6  0.0  0.9  -2.6  -3.2  52.9
1  Zimbabwe  17.2  30.1  93.6  2.7  -1.1  0.2  28.3
2  Angola  **  11.6  20.6  0.7  0.3  11.5  1.1  47.0
2  Cameroon  18.8  42.2  20.7  0.0  6.8  -2.5  32.4
2  Congo  **  32.0  33.2  4.6  2.7  3.0  -4.4  75.4
2  Mauritius  29.0  60.3  35.2  6.0  7.6  10.3  80.5
2  Senegal  12.6  12.6  7.2  2.8  2.9  1.8  36.1
3  Bangladesh  50.0  83.2  49.4  4.2  9.8  4.8  18.4
3  China  35.6  35.6  11.3  9.6  11.5  9.7  29.6
3  India  47.8  95.2  62.6  S.2  7.0  4.2  12.1
3  Nepal  16.1  16.1  0.7  5.0  9.7  4.4  21.2
3  Pakistan  50.0  73.3  14.5  6.0  10.1  3.0  30.1
3  Sri  Lanka  26.0  29.2  3.8  4.0  7.3  4.0  55.9
4  Indonesia  17.0  20.1  2.7  5.8  6.7  4.5  39.9
4  Korea  7.9  12.3  2.6  9.1  12.3  11.4  56.4
4  Malaysia  13.0  17.6  2.1  6.2  12.6  9.7  115.5
4  Papua  N  Guinea  **  7.0  14.2  2.6  3.1  6.0  1.2  69.8
4  Philippines  21.7  33.1  44.9  1.4  3.4  4.5  42.8
4  Thailand  23.1  37.8  5.5  8.2  15.5  13.8  57.3
5  Romania  12.3  12.3  0.0  -2.5  -10.8  -3.0  25.3
5  Turkey  9.0  24.7  96.4  4.6  9.1  11.0  25.9
5  Yugoslavia  11.8  12.0  29.2  0.3  4.0  1.2  39.1
6  Bahrain  3.0  3.0  1.5  2.2  3.9  0.5  123.9
6  Iran  **  20.7  100.9  99.3  2.6  4.2  1.2  19.1
6  Jordan  20.5  28.0  12.9  1.2  5.8  -2.4  68.2
6  Oman  2.5  2.5  3.6  7.6  8.4  1.2  60.7
6  Saudi  Arabia  12.1  12.1  3.9  0.4  -4.2  -5.5  74.0
6  Syria  11.0  27.5  36.6  1.8  8.3  -5.6  31.6
6  Yemen  **  16.2  22.0  28.7  3.4  1.2  -5.3  32.8
7  Algeria  22.9  24.9  9.5  2.1  3.0  -5.1  38.2
7  Egypt  42.2  42.2  45.2  4.3  0.8  -1.5  34.7
7  Libya  27.0  34.7  10.3  -5.7  -9.3  -7.2  65.0
7  Morocco  20.2  36.1  27.6  3.7  3.9  4.0  40.269
7  Tunisia  33.2  30.6  32.7  3.7  7.2  3.0  64.6
8  Argentina  15.8  19.4  0.2  0.8  3.2  -2.1  13.1
8  Bolivia  9.8  9.8  2.0  1.1  1.7  -0.1  38.4
8  Brazil  10.7  15.4  1.5  2.1  5.2  -0.8  15.2
8  Chile  11.0  19.9  0.1  5.1  6.6  4.3  41.1
8  Colombia  11.5  11.8  1.7  3.7  11.0  -0.9  25.8
8  Costa Rica  11.7  61.7  0.8  3.6  5.6  4.9  62.1
8  Ecuador  11.9  11.9  63.6  2.4  3.4  -2.2  38.4
8  El Salvador  9.2  9.2  19.2  1.6  -2.8  2.0  38.2
8  Guatemala  16.0  22.8  7.4  1.7  -0.1  1.4  31.7
8  Guyana  20.0  20.0  16.0  -1.3  0.2  -1.4  124.1
8  Haiti  **  11.6  16.8  30.8  -0.9  -0.7  -1.5  47.6
8  Jamaica  19.3  19.3  6.6  2.3  2.1  2.6  75.5
8  Mexico  13.5  16.9  3.9  1.6  5.4  6.7  24.3
8  Nicaragua  17.4  24.6  27.8  -1.8  -4.7  -3.3  48.6
8  Paraguay  8.0  8.0  1.8  2.8  8.6  7.5  27.3
8  Peru  16.3  66.3  53.4  -0.5  -0.3  -1.6  20.8
8  Trinidad  & To  17.0  43.1  *23.4  -3.6  -2.1  -8.0  70.1
8  Uruguay  14.7  28.5  14.1  1.3  2.6  1.2  30.9
8  Venezuela  11.8  17.4  2.4  2.1-  1.7  -3.6  38.8
9  Bahamas  **  32.3  33.8  0.1  4.1  9.6  9.8  206.0
9  Cyprus  10.1  -23.5  32.2  6.1  4.7  7.0  60.4
9  Hong  Kong  0.0  0.0  0.5  6.5  15.8  11.9  144.4
9  Kuwait  4.2  4.2  3.5  1.3  -6.0  -4.4  65.2
9  Qatar  5.0  5.0  1.3  -1.0  1.5  -1.1  75.2
9  Singapore  0.4  0.4  0.3  6.9  12.7  9.7  298.7
9  Taiwan,  China  11.2  11.2  35.9  8.4  10.0  13.2  79.2
9  United  Arab  Em.  *  4.5  4.5  1.0  0.3  6.0  1.9  87.8
Notes:  /a  Based  on  unweighted  averages  of  most  recent  available  tariffs  in  many  countries.
/b Include unweighted  averages  of tariffs and para tariffs  for all goods.
/c Unwighted  averages  of non-tariff  measures  for all goods.
/d Least square growth rate  of real GDP from 1980-93.
/e Least  square growth rate of merchandise  goods exports and  imports  in constant
prices  from 1980-93.
/f Average  total  trade  (exports +  imports)  as  e  of GDP  from 1980-93.
/g Countries  with  **  are the late 1980s tariffs,  total import charges,  and all NTMs,
where country classifications  are the same as Table A.1.
Sources:  UNCTAD, Directory  of Trade Regimes,  1994 and Handbook  of Trade Control Measures  of
Developing  Countries,  1987; GATT/WTO,  Trade  Policy Review, various  issues, 1990-95;
UN COMTRADE  data base;  and World Bank, World Development  Report,  1995.70
Table  A.9:  Average  Tariffs  and  NTM.  For  Industrialized  Countries  (%)
Unwgt  Unwgt  Imp  Wgt  Imp Wgt  Unwgt  Unwgt  Unwgt  Unwgt
Tariff  Tariff  Tariff  Tariff  NTMs  NTMs  QRs  QRs
Country  1989  1993  1989  1993  1989  1993  1989  1993
Australia  14.2  8.2  13.7  6.4  3.4  0.7  0.5  0.0
Austria  11.0  9.5  10.6  8.5  65.8  55.6  13.4  11.9
Canada  9.1  8.8  6.9  6.7  11.1  11.0  6.6  6.8
European  Union  7.4  7.6  6.0  6.2  26.6  23.7  19.S  17.2
Finland  7.7  7.4  5.6  5.2  10.6  8.4  9.0  7.8
IceLand  3.8  3.7  4.4  4.3  3.9  2.8
Japan  6.9  7.0  3.8  3.6  13.1  12.2  11.7  10.5
New  Zealand  14.5  8.5  14.8  8.0  14.1  0.4  13.9  0.0
Norway  5.7  5.6  4.4  4.3  26.6  23.7  19.5  17.2
Sweden  4.7  4.5  3.5  3.4  32.6  29.8  15.2  1.2
Switzerland  4.4  4.2  4.3  4.5  12.9  13.5  1.7  1.8
United  States  6.2  6.4  4.0  4.0  25.5  22.9  20.4  18.1
21  INDs  Average  8.0  6.8  6.8  5.4  22.0  17.2  11.9  7.9
Standard  Deviation  3.4  1.8  3.8  1.6  16.2  14.8  6.6  6.7
Source:  OECD,  Indicators  of Tariff  and  NTB,  1996.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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